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My dissertation focuses on the effect of several variables on two key forms
of political participation — voting and candidacy. First, I examine how voter
turnout is impacted by differences in the intensity of political beliefs across the
electorate and the resulting impact on candidate issue choice. Next, I examine
the role of term limits and political party recruitment policies in determining
the quality of the political class. Finally, I examine the impact of term limits
at the lower rungs of the political ladder on the quality of individuals seeking
higher office.
In Chapter 2, I present a modified version of Downs’ spatial model to analyze
the effect on candidates’ policy choices when there is a positive relationship
between political extremism and conviction. I assume that alienation and lack
of conviction affect voter turnout negatively. I find that the positive relationship
vii
between political extremism and conviction leads candidates away from the
center and describe the conditions under which segments of the electorate will
abstain in equilibrium. Incorporating candidate asymmetry through differences
in valence and campaign finances resulted in the strategy of the disadvantaged
candidate being unrestricted. Meanwhile, the advantaged candidate can afford
to be more centrist or extremist than his opponent in order to win the election.
In Chapter 3, I present a multi-period model analyzing the impact of political
party recruitment and retention policies and the implementation of term limits
on the quality of individuals seeking a career in politics. Candidates differ in
political skill and their political skill directly affects the provision of a public
good. Term limits lead to a restructuring of the timing of rewards for political
careers. I find that term limits increase the probability of entry of those of
lesser quality. Under certain conditions, term limits reduce the expected ability
of those entering the political arena, as those of higher ability are more adversely
affected by the restructuring of rewards.
In Chapter 4, I explore the extent to which term limits alter the average
quality of office-seekers for higher-level political positions. In addition, I deter-
mine whether improvement in quality in upper level political positions comes
at the expense of lower level positions. The results suggest that term limits
on lower level elected offices reduce the expected political skill of officeholders
at this level. Under limited circumstances, term limits will also reduce the ex-
pected political skill of those seeking upper level political positions. Under most
conditions, term limitation at lower level offices lead to an improvement in the
quality of elected officials in upper level offices.
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“A well-functioning democracy calls for a confrontation between
democratic political positions, and this requires a real debate about
possible alternatives. Consensus is indeed necessary but it must be
accompanied by dissent.” - Chantal Mouffe
Any voluntary action taken by private citizens for the purpose of influencing
public policy or electoral outcomes is a form of political participation (Verba
and Nie, 1972 p.2). Certainly, the act of voting or running for public office
would fall under this heading, with voting being one of the least costly forms of
political participation for an individual and running for public office one of the
most costly. The frequency of political participation varies amongst the types
of activities and most notably across cultures and political systems. There is
a substantial body of research aimed at explaining individual involvement in
the political process. Many theories have been developed to explain why some
individuals are politically active, while others are not. Yet, there is still no
widely accepted theory to explain political participation in its various forms.
Political conflicts are as much about ideology as they are issues. Political
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ideology — often viewed on a left-right continuum — is a set of ethical ideals
and principles that explain how society should work and suggests the most
appropriate methods of achieving the ideal social order. While a single left-
right axis may seem insufficient in describing the existing variation in political
beliefs, political conflicts tend to be organized on a one-dimensional axis. The
intensity of political beliefs varies across individuals and we should expect an
individual’s understanding of political information to be influenced by their
unique set of beliefs.
The quality of those individuals who run for and are elected to public office
is an important issue for all democracies. Individuals enter politics for a vari-
ety of reasons — monetary rewards, power, the opportunity to showcase their
talent, and the desire to implement certain policies, to name a few. Among
these entrants, success hinges on their ability to navigate the political system.
Political Skill is the ability to influence and win support from others — things
that a modern political system requires and rewards. It is often seen as a strong
predictor of career success both inside and outside of the political arena.
In my dissertation, I focus on the effect of several variables on two key
forms of political participation — voting and candidacy. First, I examine how
prospective issue voter turnout is impacted by differences in the intensity of
political beliefs across the electorate and the resulting impact on candidate
issue choice. How is the burden of voting shared among an electorate with
members having different intensities of preferences? Next, I examine the role of
term limits and political party recruitment policies in determining the quality
of the political class. Do term limits encourage the creation of a mediocracy,
that is, rule by the mediocre, in lieu of a meritocracy? Finally, I examine the
impact of term limits at the lower rungs of the political ladder on the quality of
individuals seeking higher office.
2
1.1 Polarization and Alienation
"Democracy is being allowed to vote for the candidate you dislike
least." —Robert Byrne.
In the 2002 California gubernatorial elections, the incumbent, Gray Davis,
was re-elected by a slender margin in an election marked by the lowest voter
turnout in that state’s gubernatorial history, opening the door for the recall that
would follow. Davis and his opponent, Bill Simon, were ideologically polarized, if
you believe the millions of dollars’ worth of campaign advertisements. However,
they shared one thing in common - high voter dissatisfaction, with polls showing
that voters would prefer to have had other choices than Mr. Davis and Mr.
Simon.
Since the 1970s, there has been a marked increase in the polarization of the
policy positions of Democrats and Republicans in the U.S. (McCarty, Poole and
Rosenthal, 2003). As ideological divisions deepened in the 1990s, once orthog-
onal debates morphed into conflicts along one-dimensional liberal-conservative
axis (McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal, 1997). Some blame can be attributed to
the recent tactics of the two main political parties. The 2008 electoral campaign
seemed to signal a reversal of this polarization trend, with a noticeably greater
participation by formerly disenfranchised members of the electorate.
Canadian politics has traditionally been less polarized than U.S. politics.
However, a succession of unstable minority governments since 2004 has revealed
a fracturing political consensus, and a polarization of political parties that ap-
pears to be getting worse. In many Western Democracies, including Canada
and the United States, voter turnout has been on the decline for over a decade.
The belief that low turnout represents a democratic crisis is widely held1.
Why should we be concerned with polarization trends and alienation at the
1See Lijphart 1997 and Putnam 2000.
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citizen level? Canadians should be concerned about the growing list of priorities
and crises that remain unaddressed by national legislation. Polarization is par-
tially to blame for the recent lack of policy-making in the area of environmental
policy, complacency regarding foreign policy and the gradual shift away from
fiscal conservatism. Meanwhile, in the U.S., polarization has lead to political
paralysis, leaving issues such as health care, immigration policy, the impact of
the aging U.S. population on Social Security, energy independence and climate
change unresolved for more than a decade.
Turnout does not only affect which policy option is selected but also influ-
ences the policy options from which voters must choose. Citizens must not only
choose for whom to vote but whether to vote at all. Previous research has shown
that those who participate matter and that the level of voter participation in-
fluences public policy (e.g. Hill et al (1995), Fleck (1999)). Political alienation,
defined as the perception of distance or a feeling of separation from political in-
stitutions and political leaders, representing a negative attitude or indifference,
is a significant contributor to low voter turnout in elections2. Closely tied to
the concept of alienation is that of political tolerance. Tolerance, as defined by
Hinich and Ordeshook (1969), reflects the degree of separation between the ideal
policy position of voters and their preferred candidates that voters are willing
to abide, beyond which they feel alienated. The idea of alienation as a strategic
consideration for politicians or political parties is not new3.
Downs’s (1957) seminal contribution to analytical political theory, the median-
voter theorem, states that in a spatial model of electoral competition upon which
two candidates compete by choosing their location on a single-dimensional issue
space and voters have single-peaked preferences over the issue space, the median
position can never be defeated in a majority rule contest. In other words, Down-
2See Nownes 1992 and Teixeira 1987, 1992
3See Hinich and Ordeshook (1969), Davis, Hinich and Ordeshook (1970).
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sian theory implies the convergence of candidates’ policies away from their own
party base and toward the preferred policy of the median voter in the electorate.
A large body of theoretical work has advanced to explain the differences
between the median-voter theoretical result and the empirical evidence of non-
convergence to the “middle”. The present school of thought suggests that con-
vergence is highly unlikely. Often the theoretical work draws on countervailing
forces that offset the pull to the middle, such as the candidates’ own prefer-
ences, the desire to advance in the party pecking order, and the need to appeal
to partisan voters in order to raise campaign funds. The empirical evidence for
nonconvergence is compelling4.
In the chapter “Platform Polarization and Voter Turnout,” the main objec-
tive is to explain how an exogenously determined relationship between political
extremism and rigidity, as well as the probability of abstention, affects the po-
larization of policy platforms and voter turnout. This chapter is motivated by
two observations: (1) individuals holding relatively extreme political opinions
tend to be more confident in their beliefs; and (2) individuals with such extreme
beliefs appear to be more vocal and likely to participate in elections and other
political activities.
In a modified version of Downs’ spatial model, I analyze the effect on can-
didates’ policy choices when there is a positive relationship between political
extremism and conviction. I assume that alienation and lack of conviction affect
voter turnout negatively. The main result implies that office-seeking candidates
do best by catering to their partisan constituency and provides an alternative
explanation for nonconvergence, without appealing to countervailing forces such
as the candidates’s preferences.
4See Poole and Rosenthal (1984); Snyder (1994); Erikson and Wright (1997, 2000); Adams,
Bishin, and Dow (2004); and Lee, Moretti and Butler (2004).
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1.2 Candidacy and Term Limits
“Those who are too smart to engage in politics are punished by
being governed by those who are dumber.” - Plato
The debate over term limits, that is, limiting the number of terms in office
served by elected politicians, has raged on over the years in many countries.
Term limits come in various forms, and those in favor of term limits must specify
the exact form they should take. Though proponents and critics of term limits
tend to consider the behavioral effects, such as the impact on policy-making, it
is on the compositional effects that I wish to focus.
Proponents of term limits often argue that term limits will reduce the in-
fluence of campaigning on elected officials as well as open up legislative offices
to minorities and other under-represented groups, allowing for a greater influx
of new ideas into legislatures. Opponents argue that term limits reduce the
average experience of legislators and diminish a legislature’s institutional mem-
ory. Crucial to this argument is the nature of the incumbent advantage, which
reflects the fact that incumbents win substantially more than half of the time.
On the other side, is the argument that term limits will eliminate the positive
selection effects of incumbency — becoming an incumbent requires electoral suc-
cess, and successful candidates will have a propensity to be of higher quality.
Others argue that term limits decrease the desirability to pursue a long-term
career in politics.
In the US, the debate has been primarily on whether limiting all legislative
representatives to two consecutive terms in an office would improve the demo-
cratic process. In the US Federal government, only the President is limited by
the constitution to two terms. US Senators may serve for an unlimited num-
ber of six-year terms, meanwhile US House Representatives may serve for an
unlimited number of two-year terms.
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At the state level, term limitation laws were adopted in 21 states and are
still in effect in 15 states across the US with Idaho, Massachusetts, Oregon,
Utah, Washington and Wyoming having repealed such legislation. Currently,
36 states have term limits of various forms for their governors. There is also
much debate over whether all Representatives/Senators within the legislative
body should be subject to the same restrictions. In the early 1990s, referenda
on congressional term limits were voted on in 23 states.
In most of Latin America, politicians can only serve one term at a time in
an elected office, with very few restrictions on serving a position for a second
time, provided that it is not consecutive. For example, a politician would be
free to serve as governor for one term, serve as senator for a subsequent term
before returning to the position of governor for a second term. Constitutional
amendments have been put forward, some passing, to relax these restrictions.
In the 1990s, politicians and voters in countries such as Argentina, Brazil and
Peru sought to change their constitutions to allow for re-election of presidents,
arguing for continuity. There the debate is often prompted by the popularity
of a particular President (for example, Fernando Henrique Cardoso of Brazil,
Alvaro Uribe Velez of Colombia, and Hugo Chavez of Venezuela).
One key question to answer is whether term limits could achieve something
that voters could not do for themselves? In a truly democratic process, voters
should be able to rid themselves of substandard incumbents through the ballot
box. Also, term limits would remove the ability of the electorate to retain pop-
ular and competent incumbents. Critics argue that such an important decision
should not be separated from the electorate.
Proponents point to possible inefficiencies resulting from incumbent advan-
tages — advantages that incumbents have in any re-election bid which are inde-
pendent of their performance, competencies or policy positions relative to their
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opponents. Palmer and Simon (2008) argue that the incumbent advantage is
an amalgamation of the different entry barriers for new candidates and suggests
that it may be a signal of electoral inefficiency. Incumbent advantages include
greater access to sources for campaign funding, an already in place campaign
organization and staff, and name-recognition. Over the last three decades, U.S.
House Representatives have enjoyed a re-election rate above 90 percent. While
the percentage is not as dramatic, Senate races still overwhelmingly favor the
incumbent. Note however that these percentages do not take into account the
number of Senators and House members who retired because they were not
confident of being re-elected.
It is often argued that term limits would help to cure what Harry Truman
referred to as “terrible legislative diseases” — “senility and seniority.” It is sug-
gested that term limits would bring new talent and experiences into the political
sector, including those who otherwise would not consider a political career, and
prevent “the fossilization of the key committees.” In the 1990s, state legisla-
tive term limits resulted in increased turnover rates and a reduction in average
tenure, with many representatives opting out early to run for higher office in
anticipation of being forced out (Francis, Kenny, & Anderson, 2000).
With the increase in legislative turnover resulting from the implementation
of term limits, supporters argue that term limits would create a class of “citizen
legislators” so that those serving in legislatures would not spend their entire
lives there. James Madison envisioned Congress as such a legislative body,
where representatives would be “called for the most part from pursuits of a
private nature and continued in appointment for a short period of office.”
Countering this is the observation that experience is a valuable commodity
in politics. Rookie representatives require time in office before mastering the
various tasks required of them and the public good may be best served by a sys-
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tem that allows for some continuity and accumulation of institutional memory
in the legislative body. Term limits would remove the ability of the electorate
to retain experienced politicians. In addition, the possibility of re-election on
the horizon, it is argued, ensures accountability and helps to align the repre-
sentative’s interests with that of the electorate. The implementation of term
limits, as argued by Alexander Hamilton, would result in “a diminution of the
inducements to good behavior.”
Term limitations are unlikely to be implemented in the U.S. Congress be-
cause of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1995 ruling that state-imposed term limits are
unconstitutional5. However, if states were able to impose term limits on their
congressional positions, this would lead to a redistribution of political power
within Congress (Friedman and Wittman, 1995) and have implications for the
class of individuals who would be attracted to these positions.
In the chapter “Candidate Recruitment under Term Limits,” I present a
multi-period model of candidate entry analyzing the impact of political party
recruitment and retention policies and the implementation of term limits on the
political skill of individuals seeking a career in politics, when political aptitude
is valued in both the political and private sector. Depending on the retention
policies of political parties and the effect term limits have on restructuring of
rewards to a political career, term limits could reduce or improve the expected
quality of entrants into the political arena.
In most countries, very few individuals start off their political careers at the
top of the political ladder. Most successful politicians are not celebrities (former
professional athletes or entertainers) nor do they rely on trust funds or billion-
dollar corporate empires, but emerge at the highest levels after a determined
progression through the political ranks. Often, much time is spent campaigning
in local elections, before moving on to increasingly larger state or provincial
5U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thorton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995)
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districts, then to federal government legislatures or governorships, and then
possibly to the executive office.
In the chapter “Candidate Ambition and Advancement Under Term Limits,”
I present a multi-period model of candidate entry into a two-tiered hierarchy
of political positions, which explores the extent to which term limits alter the
average quality of office-seekers who advance to higher-level political positions.
The results suggest that term limits at the lower level political positions leads
to the sacrifice of quality at the lower level in exchange for an improvement in






Elections are the main means by which constituents hold their elected officials
accountable for their policy decisions and performance while in office. Downs
(1957) argued that there is a strong pull to the preferences of the median voter
as both parties or candidates compete for the support of the median members
of the electorate. If we agree with the main results of the Downsian framework,
electoral competition should result in parties, candidates and policies that reflect
the preferences of the median voter. In reality, parties and candidates fail to
converge to the center and prior research has suggested many explanations.
Firstly, in most instances the position of the median voter cannot be precisely
determined and there may exist a great deal of uncertainty on this position. Sec-
ondly, the primary system in the US Presidential and Congressional elections
encourages candidates to cater to the more extreme preferences of constituents
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who vote in the parties’ primaries. Thirdly, the candidates themselves have
preferences over the policies implemented and care about more than just win-
ning elections. Fourthly, in many political environments participation is not
mandatory but voluntary, and as a result candidates must specifically cater to
the preferences of those who are likely to vote. Finally, voters not only look at
the distance between their ideal positions and that of the candidates but also at
their character and reputation when deciding to cast their votes so candidates
need not race to the middle in order to capture the majority of votes. I propose
an alternative explanation - that differences in the conviction with which voters
hold their beliefs about the ideal policy position can lead to nonconvergence in
candidates’ policy platforms.
Several modifications of the Downsian model have shown that in two-party
political systems, the policies chosen by parties or candidates need not con-
verge to the most-preferred policy of the median voter. Alesina and Rosenthal
(1995, 1996) and Faulí-Oller, Ok and Ortuño-Ortín (2003) provide alternative
explanations for polarized policy platforms. For Alesina and Rosenthal, par-
ties/candidates cannot make credible commitments to their proposed policies
as the policy that is ultimately implemented results from compromise between
the executive branch and the legislature. This gives candidates with prefer-
ences over the policy space incentive to choose radical policy positions. In
Faulí-Oller et al, candidates can make credible commitments on their proposed
policies and platform polarization results from the strategic delegation by par-
ties to radical candidates when there is uncertainty about the distribution of
voters’ preferences.
The standard framework also assumes that regardless of the distance of voter
positions to that of the candidates, voters never abstain, but still vote for the
candidate that is closest to them. It does not leave room for the possibility that
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extremist voters may become alienated if they feel that the available candidates
are too centrist or that moderate voters may feel alienated by extreme candi-
dates. Not only do individuals in society differ in their political ideology and
opinions about parties and policies, they also differ in the strength of their con-
victions on those beliefs. While some individuals may be open to compromise as
they are presented with new information, others are more uncompromising and
confident in their beliefs. Given these two differences across individuals - ideol-
ogy and conviction - the next question to ask is how are these two differences
related? More specifically, are individuals with relatively moderate opinions
less confident and more willing to compromise than individuals with an extreme
political stance? In this paper, I ask the question "If extremism goes hand
in hand with confidence, how does this affect candidates’ strategies and voter
turnout?"
Blomberg and Harrington (2000) argue that rigidity, defined as a lack of
responsiveness to new information, and extremism are related. In their model
there is initially no assumed relationship between any agent’s policy preference
or his rigidity. However, agents’ updating their beliefs in response to receiving
a series of publicly observable signals results in a positive correlation between
extremism and rigidity. So, the probability that an agent is very rigid is greater
among those agents with extreme views. The intuition behind this is as follows.
When an agent receives new information, the only way in which that agent can
persist with extreme views is if he had initially attached high confidence to those
extreme views, i.e. his beliefs are rigid. If he did not attach high probability to
them, he would have adjusted his beliefs towards that of the majority of agents
upon receiving new information. So learning induces this positive correlation.
However, their argument suggests that after receiving successive signals, every
individual’s estimate should converge, which we don’t actually observe. On
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the other hand, what is perceived as an extreme political stance changes over
time. Blomberg and Harrington go on to test their hypothesis using data on the
voting behavior (used as a proxy for beliefs) of members of the U.S. Congress
and find that legislators with relatively extreme voting behavior in their early
years in Congress were less likely to change their voting behavior over time.
A large body of theoretical and empirical research has been devoted to ad-
dressing an apparent paradox in the theory of political behavior. We still lack
a satisfactory explanation of the paradox of voting using rational choice theory.
Downs (1957) pointed out that a small positive cost of voting would usually ex-
ceed any benefits perceived by an expected utility maximizer. So, it was thought
that the act of voting is characteristically irrational. In applying rational choice
theory to electoral participation, in most cases the model predicts abstention.
This lies in conflict with the large numbers of people who do vote in elections.
Often, consumption benefits derived from the fundamental act of voting have
been used to account for the nonzero voter turnout1. However, using consump-
tive benefits as an explanation of voter participation seems to render the use of
rational choice models in this context uninteresting as it removes the decision
to participate from politics. Modifications to the rational choice models have
proven unsatisfactory or implausible for large electorates2. Also of interest is
the large gap between the levels of voter participation that can be explained by
the theory and the levels that we observe3.
Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) present a compelling argument that cam-
paigns are a major determinant of voter turnout. They argue “citizens partici-
pate in elections and government both because they go to politics and because
politics comes to them”. Their study is an example of those that stress the im-
1See Riker and Ordershook (1968).
2Ferejohn and Fiorina (1974), Ledyard (1981, 1984) and Opp (1986).
3Ledyard (1984) and Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983, 1985). Their models suggest a maximum
of 3-5% turnout for a reasonably sized electorate, which lies in contrast to the 30% or higher
observed in most elections.
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portance of the mobilizing effects of political parties and candidate campaigns in
determining turnout. My argument here is that candidates will not only battle
over voter shares, but over turnout. The strategy is commonly referred to as
"bringing out the base". Candidates must not only appeal to the preferences of
the likely voters but must try to motivate those with policy preferences closer
to their own to turnout while trying to suppress the turnout of their opponents
political base. I propose that individuals abstain for two reasons. Individu-
als will abstain if they feel that their beliefs are not sufficiently represented by
either candidate. They will also abstain if they do not feel confident in their
opinions. Several studies have examined the effect of campaign spending on an
individual’s likelihood of voting and/or the effect of campaign spending at the
aggregate level for statewide, congressional and state legislative contests. The
majority of such studies find a positive relationship between campaign spending
and voter turnout4.
One could ask what is the importance of incorporating voter participation?
One answer would be the possible impact of voter turnout on distributive policy.
Previous research has highlighted the facts that those who participate matter
and that levels of voter participation influence public policy. Hill et al (1995)
provide evidence that welfare spending is positively correlated with the voter
participation of lower income groups. Fleck (1999) finds that differences in
turnout can result in significant differences in the allocation of resources across
the electorate. Fleck modeled the effect of the level of voter turnout on the
distribution of government funds. The model predicted that regions with higher
voter turnout would receive more government funds, all things being equal,
4Caldiera (et al, 1985) make the case for the importance of political mobilization by can-
didates and political parties in convincing individuals to vote. They concluded that analyses
of voter turnout that “omit political mobilization are partial and suspect”. Cox and Munger
(1989) and Gilliam (1985) examine the aggregate effects of spending for congressional elec-
tions, while Caldiera and Patterson (1983) examine the same question for state legislative
contest.
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regardless of whether politicians are primarily concerned with re-election or
popular policy. Fleck found strong empirical support for the model’s predictions.
Several papers analyze equilibrium when one candidate has a valence ad-
vantage. Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000) incorporate valence issues into a
multidimensional spatial model and establish the conditions under which a pure
strategy equilibrium exists. The candidate with the valence advantage, the win-
ner, locates at the median while there are no restrictions placed on the strategies
of the disadvantaged candidate. The model in this paper is more closely related
to that of Berger, Munger and Pothoff (2000). In their model voters are un-
certain about each candidate’s policy position. When there is a candidate with
lower variance in policy position, no equilibrium exists. However, if the policy
position of the candidate with lower variance is fixed, then an equilibrium exists
in which the higher-variance candidate diverges from the fixed platform position
of the lower variance candidate. Also, the candidate with the lowest variance
need not locate at the median of the distribution in order to win. In my model
I assume that the uncertainty for voters does not lie with the policy position
of the candidates but with their own preferred policy position. The result is
the divergence in location of the two candidates even in the absence of valence
issues. With the addition of valence issues and an advantaged candidate, I find
that if we exclude equilibria in which either candidate plays a weakly dominated
strategy, the advantaged candidate is able to locate more or less centrally than
the disadvantaged candidate in order to win the election.
In this paper I investigate the properties of the equilibria in a variation of the
simultaneous location game. The first objective of this paper is to analyze the
effect on candidates’ policy choices and voter turnout when there is a positive re-
lationship between political extremism and conviction. Conviction is measured
in terms of the confidence voters hold over their preferred policies, while extrem-
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ism is measured in terms of the absolute distance of voters’ preferred policies to
that of the median voter. In my model, lack of conviction and alienation both
affect turnout negatively. I assume that agents will abstain if they do not feel
confident in their estimation of the right policy or when the candidates’ policy
choices are too distant from their own. Under these conditions, the positive
relationship between extremism and conviction leads candidates away from the
median of the electorate in their efforts to maximize vote shares. Rather than
share a base by adopting the median position, each candidate distances him-
self from his opponent in order to establish his own base of voters. However,
candidates do not locate at the extremes of the political spectrum either. The
second objective of this paper is to analyze the role of campaign advertising as
a secondary tool by which the candidates can distinguish themselves and their
base of voters. Through campaign advertising, the candidate with the valence
disadvantage can level the playing field providing he/she has sufficient campaign
funds.
2.2 Model
In this model the electorate, I, is comprised of a set of voters who will select
by popular vote a representative. There are also two candidates, L and R,
competing in the election. Candidates are strictly office-seeking politicians
and do not have preferred policies. The type of policy under consideration is
objective in nature, affecting the entire electorate; such as national security or
education. The utility of candidate c ∈ {L,R} is
uc =
 V if c wins the election0 otherwise , V > 0.
Each candidate announces his/her policy position on an unidimensional policy
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space, xc ∈ Xc ⊂ X = [−T, T ] where T > 0, before the election. For sim-
plicity let us assume that candidate L’s strategy space, XL, is [−T, 0] and that
candidate R’s strategy space, XR, is [0, T ].
Voters on the other hand, care about the candidates’ policy positions and
their non-policy characteristics. These non-policy characteristics are easily ver-
ifiable in nature, such as a candidate’s previous political performance. Let
βc ∈ {0, 1} represent candidate c’s non-policy characteristics. βc, c = L,R, is
observed by both candidates and by the voters, with 1 representing a favorable
political history and 0 an unfavorable one. A voter’s preferences are said to be
extreme if his/her preferred policies differ significantly from that of the median
preferred policy in the population. Second, a voter is defined as uncompro-
mising if he assigns high confidence to his beliefs. Let the density function
fi(x|µi, vi) denote voter i’s beliefs over X, that is fi(x|µi, vi) represents voter
i’s beliefs about what is the best policy, where µi and vi are the mean and
variance of voter i’s distribution, respectively. Let us assume that the µis are
uniformly distributed across X. So voters can be identified by the location of
their mean policy position, µi. Let m represent the agent with the median
mean policy position in the population. Let µm be the mean of the median
agent’s distribution over X. Voter i is therefore considered extreme if |µi−µm|
is relatively large, and agent i assigns high confidence to his/her beliefs if vi is
relatively small. The distribution of the µis and fis are both common knowledge
between the candidates.
I assume that voter preferences are symmetric and single-peaked with respect
to policies. Specifically, the utility received by voter i when candidate c wins
and voter i considers x to be the best policy is ui(xc, x) = uo+αβc− (xc−x)2.
Given voter i’s beliefs over X,
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Eui(µi, vi, xc) =
Z
ui(xc, x)fi(x|µi, vi)dx
Eui(µi, xc) = uo + αβc − vi − (xc − µi)2 (2.1)
The differences in expected utility between candidate proposals if candidate
proposals are (xL, xR)
Eui(µi, xL)−Eui(µi, xR) = α(βL − βR) + (xR − µi)2 − (xL − µi)2 (2.2)
Eui(µi, xL)−Eui(µi, xR) = α(βL − βR) + (xR − xL)(xR + xL − 2µi) (2.3)
So in the absence of abstentions and campaign advertising, we have the standard
model, yielding the median voter result.
Relationship Between Extremism and Conviction
For now, let vi ∈ {0, vm} and pi be the probability that vi = vm. If voters
with extreme policy positions are more likely to possess greater conviction than
moderate voters, then we would expect vi to be negatively correlated with the
absolute value of µi. If we compare two voters, say voter 1 and voter 2, and
|µ1| ≤ |µ2| this would imply that p1 ≥ p2. Suppose pi = p(µ) is the probability
that vi = vm conditional on µi = µ, that is p(µ) = Pr{vi = vm|µi = µ}. So if
|µ1| ≤ |µ2| then p(µ1) ≥ p(µ2). It follows that E[vi|µi = µ1] ≥ E[vi|µi = µ2]
and that argmaxE[v|µ] = argmax p(µ) = 0.
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Now suppose instead that vi ∈ [0, vm] and that E[v|µ] = v(µ), that is,
v(µ) is the expected variance of voters with mean µ. v(µi) is a continuously
differentiable function on [−T, 0) ∪ (0, T ] and
dv(µi)
dµi
≥ 0 for µi < 0 and
dv(µi)
dµi
≤ 0 for µi > 0 (A1)
v(T ) = v(−T ) = 0, and v(0) = vm (A2)
so that argmax
µ
v(µ) = 0. Functional forms for v(µ) that satisfy (A1) and (A2)




v(µ) = vm − vm|µ|
T
(F2)
Now, if we make a stronger assumption that extremists possess more convic-
tion in their political beliefs than moderates, we would expect vi to be decreasing
in |µi|. I assume that v(µ) is no longer the expected variance of voters with
mean µ but that vi = v(µi) for all i ∈ I. The downside to this stronger assump-
tion is that previously there was a positive probability that moderate voters
could have lower variances, now I have ruled out the possibility that there are
"experts" in the middle.
2.2.1 Voter Participation
I assume that voters will not vote for a candidate if they feel that this candidate’s
political views are too distant from their own. What if a constituent feels that
neither candidate is close enough to their preferred policy? In this model,
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I will incorporate the idea of political alienation by means of a participation
constraint. Similar to Enelow and Hinich (1984), I assume that Voter i ∈ I will
abstain if his/her expected utility from the policy choice of his/her preferred
candidate fails to exceed a certain positive threshold, that is,
E[uo + αβc − (xc − x)2] < u (2.4)
⇒
Z
(xc − x)2fi(x|µi, vi)dx > θc (2.5)
where θc = uo + αβc−u. θc can be interpreted as a tolerance parameter. If the
above holds, voter i feels that candidate c is too distant and will not vote for
him, or voter i does not feel confident enough of their estimate of the right policy
to cast a vote. If the inequality holds for both xL and xR, then the voter will
abstain. By contrast, the Downsian model assumes that voters never abstain
regardless of the distance. They will decide whom to vote for based on the
relative distance even when the difference between candidates is infinitesimal.
So there are two sources of abstention in this model - alienation and lower
precision of beliefs. However, in this model precision is not independent of
alienation.
2.3 Equilibrium
2.3.1 Equilibrium when voters care only about policy
For this section I assume that the voters only care about the policy implemented
and not about the candidates’ non-policy characteristics, that is α = 0 and
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θR = θL = θ. Since I have assumed that xL ≤ 0 ≤ xR, voter i ∈ I will vote for
candidate L if




Voter i will vote for candidate R if




Finally, Voter i will abstain if
v(µi) + (xL − µi)2 > θ and (2.10)
v(µi) + (xR − µi)2 > θ. (2.11)
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I also assume that if v(µi) + (xc − µi)2 ≤ θ for c = L,R and µi = xL+xR2 , voter
i will vote for either candidate with equal probability.
Each candidate wishes to maximize the probability that he is elected by
maximizing the proportion of agents that will vote for him/her. Given any
profile of policy positions (xL, xR), let BL denote the set of voters voting for
candidate L, that is BL = {i ∈ I| v(µi) + (xL − µi)2 ≤ θ and xL+xR2 > µi}.
Similarly, BR = {i ∈ I| v(µi) + (xR − µi)2 ≤ θ and xL+xR2 < µi}. Given the
shape of v(µi) + (xR − µi)2, BL is an interval [µL, µL] which will be defined
below. Let s(BL) be the size of this interval. So if µi ∈ [µL, µL], then voter
i will vote for candidate L. Similarly if µi ∈ BR = [µR, µR] then agent i will
vote for candidate R. Let s(BR) be the size of this interval. Let A = {i ∈ I|
v(µi) + (xc − µi)2 > θ for c = L,R}, that is the set of voters who will abstain.
Also let λL1 and λL2 be the roots of the equation v(µ) + (xL − µ)2 − θ = 0 and
λR1 and λR2 the roots of the equation v(µ) + (xR − µ)2 − θ = 0. Let λc1 ≥ λc2
for c = L,R. Then µ
L
= max{λL2,−T} and µL = min{λL1, xL+xR2 }. Also
µ
R




4x2c − 4(1− a)(vm + x2c − θ)




4x2c − 4(1− a)(vm + x2c − θ)
2(1− a) c = L,R (2.13)
where a = vmT 2 .
5Using F2 gives us λR1 = xR + a2 +
p
a(a+ xR) + θ − σ2m, λR2 = xR + a2 −p
a(a+ xR) + θ − σ2m, λL1 = xL + a2 +
p
a(a− xL) + θ − σ2m, and λL2 = xL + a2 −p
a(a− xL) + θ − σ2m.
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So the size of the segment of the electorate voting for candidate c given (xL, xR)
is
s(Bc|xL, xR) =
 µc − µc if xL < xR(µc−µc)
2 if xL = xR = 0
, c = L,R (2.14)
The probability that candidate c wins the election is
πR(xL, xR) =

1 if s(BL|xL, xR) < s(BR|xL, xR)
1
2 if s(BL|xL, xR) = s(BR|xL, xR)
0 if s(BL|xL, xR) > s(BR|xL, xR)
(2.15)
That is, if s(BL|xL, xR) > s(BR|xL, xR), candidate L wins the election and
when the voter bases are of equal size, then either candidate has a 50% chance
of winning the election.
Before we proceed we need to make some additional assumptions on v(µ),
given the two functional forms to make our results interesting. Firstly, vm ≤ θ,
so that the median voter with µi = 0, is either indifferent about voting and
abstaining or prefers to vote for a candidate that announces xc = 0. Secondly,
Ta <
√
θ and a = vmT2 < 1, to rule out the possibility that some agents never vote
under any circumstances. Finally
q
θ−vm
(1−a) < T, so that µc < T and µc > −T
when xc = 0, that is, extreme voters are alienated by centrist candidates.
CandidateR’s expected utility given (xL, xR) is E[uR|xL, xR] = V πR(xL, xR).
Given the assumptions about the shape of v(µ) + (xR − µ)2, for any xL ∈
XL, there are at most two values of xR ∈ XR such that s(BL|xL, xR) =
s(BR|xL, xR). Let bxR(xL) ≤ bbxR(xL) denote these values6. It can be shown







that for any xR ∈ (bxR(xL), bbxR(xL)), s(BL|xL, xR) < s(BR|xL, xR). However
when xL =
√
θ − T , bxR(xL) = bbxR(xL) = T −√θ. Figure 1 (in the Appendix)
shows Candidate R’s best response correspondence for all xL ∈ XL. Candidate
L’s best response correspondence follows a similar construction and is illustrated
in Figure 2 (also in the Appendix). So we can define a Nash Equilibrium of the
election game (with β = 0) as a (x∗L, x
∗
R) such that πc(x
∗
c , x
∗−c) ≥ πc(x0c, x∗−c)
for all x0c ∈ Xc, c = L,R.
Firstly, the policies chosen by the candidates will not converge to the center.
Proposition 1 For any x−c, xc = 0 is never a best response for candidate c.
xL = xR = 0 is not an equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose xR = 0 and xL ∈ XL. Using F1, this implies that µR =q
θ−vm
(1−a) < T and µR = max{xL2 ,−
q
θ−vm






= xL2 , which implies that the size of the segment of the electorate vot-
ing for candidate R is s(BR|xL, xR) =
q
θ−vm
(1−a) − xL2 and for the size of the








(1−a) and candidate R shifted his/her policy po-



























(1−a) = s(BL|xL, x0R) and R would win the election. Sup-
pose that µL = −T and candidate R shifted his/her policy position right to
x0R = |xL| − ε. Then s(BR|xL, x0R) = T + ε2 > T − ε2 = s(BL|xL, x0R) and
R would win the election. Now in case (ii) xL2 < −
q
θ−vm




which implies that the size of the segment of the electorate voting for candi-
date R is s(BR|xL, xR) = 2
q
θ−vm






(1−a) and candidate R shifted his policy position right to x
0
R =





























(1−a) = s(BL|xL, x0R)
and R would win the election. Suppose that µL = −T and candidate R















(1−a) = s(BL|xL, x0R)and
R would win the election. So for any xL ∈ XL, there is always a strategy for
candidate R that strictly dominates xR = 0. The argument for candidate L is
analogous. From this we can see that xL = xR = 0 is not an equilibrium. Specif-
ically, s(BR|0, 0) = s(BL|0, 0) =
q
θ−vm
(1−a) and if candidate R shifted to the right










(1−a) = s(BR|0, ε).
The candidates will not converge to the median.
For any given xR ∈ XR, if xL = 0, candidate L can always do better by
shifting his position to the left. The segment of voters that he/she loses to the
right by doing so is outweighed by the segment of voters that he/she gains from
the left as these agents have lower variances than those with µi = 0. Also, the
candidates do not locate at the extremes (−T, T ) in equilibrium.




θ − T, T − √θ) is the unique equilibrium of the
election game (with α = 0).
Proof. First : For any xL ∈ XL and 0 ≤ xR < T −
√
θ, λR1 < T , so
s(BR|xL, xR) = λR1−max{λR2, xL+xR2 }. In case i) λR2 > xL+xR2 , so s(BR|xL, xR) =√
4x2Ra+4(1−a)(θ−vm)
1−a which is strictly increasing in xR. In case ii) λR2 <
xL+xR
2 , so s(BR|xL, xR) = xR1−a +
√
4x2Ra+4(1−a)(θ−vm)




1−a which is strictly increasing in xR. Second: For any xL ∈ XL
and T −√θ < xR ≤ T , λR1 > T , so s(BR|xL, xR) = T− max{λR2, xL+xR2 }. In











is strictly decreasing in xR and therefore pR(xL, xR) is strictly decreasing in xR.
In case ii), λR2 < xL+xR2 , so s(BR|xL, xR) = T− xL+xR2 which is decreasing in
x. Similarly, s(BL|xL, xR) is strictly decreasing in xL, when
√
θ − T < xL ≤ 0
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and strictly increasing in xL when −T ≤ xL <
√
θ − T . The best response
correspondence for candidate R given the policy position of candidate L is
x∗R(xL) =

(bxR(xL), bbxR(xL)) if xL ∈ (√θ − T, 0]
|xL| if xL =
√
θ − T
(bxR(xL), bbxR(xL)) if xL ∈ [−T,√θ − T )
The best response correspondence for candidate L given the policy position of
candidate R is analogous.
x∗L(xR) =

(bxL(xR), bbxL(xR)) if xR ∈ [0, T −√θ)
−xR if xR = T −
√
θ
(bxL(xR), bbxL(xR)) if xR ∈ (T −√θ, T ]
In this equilibrium, extreme agents turnout to vote. If there are abstentions,
they will come from the moderate agents in the population.
Proposition 3 If T (1+a)2 >
√
θ, there exists a segment of agents (in the middle)
who will abstain. Moreover, as the normalized difference in confidence between
the median and most extreme agents, a = vm/T 2, increases, the size of the
segment of agents who abstain increases with no impact on the candidates’
equilibrium positions.
Proof. f there is a segment of voters in the middle who will abstain, this implies
that µ∗
R








1−a > 0 =⇒
x∗R > θ − vm =⇒ T + vm > 2
√
θ =⇒ T (1+a)2 >
√
θ. If T (1+a)2 >
√
θ, then the
segment of nonvoters, [µ∗L, µ
∗
R

















1−a . Since xL = −xR, the size of the segment is
µ∗
R



















which increases with a.
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This proposition simply states that as extreme agents become more confident
in their beliefs relative to moderate agents, the candidates’ absolute distance
from the center becomes more important and as a consequence a larger segment
of moderate agents feel alienated. A larger θ, that is a higher tolerance for voters,
lowers the closeness requirement for candidates to voters and the confidence
requirement for voters to participate. So as θ gets large, we should expect a
reversion to the median voter result. On the other hand, as θ decreases, and
voters less tolerant, the candidate’s optimal positions become more polarized
and the segment of the electorate that abstains, increases7.
2.3.2 Equilibrium when voters care about the candidates’
non-policy characteristics
Now let us assume that α > 0, that is, the voters not only care about the policy
that is ultimately implemented but about the political history of the candidate
elected. Since I have assumed that xL ≤ 0 ≤ xR, voter i ∈ I will vote for
candidate L if
v(µi) + (xL − µi)2 ≤ θL and (2.16)
xL + xR
2
− α(βR − βL)
2(xR − xL) > µi. (2.17)
7 I would like to note that we would arrive at similar results if instead we assumed that
the utility threshold by which voters choose whether or not to participate varied with the
position of their preferred policy. More specifically, I could have assumed that voter i ∈ Ψ




when 0 < xi ≤ T and ∂θ∂xi = 0 at xi = 0. Along with some additional assumptions on θ(xi)
we would get the divergence result.
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Voter i will vote for candidate R if
v(µi) + (xR − µi)2 ≤ θR and (2.18)
xL + xR
2
− α(βR − βL)
2(xR − xL) < µi. (2.19)
Finally, Voter i will abstain if
v(µi) + (xc − µi)2 > θc for c = L,R (2.20)
As before, λc1 and λc2 (λc1 ≥ λc2) denote the roots of the equation v(µi) +
(xc − µi)2 = θc for c = L,R. While the definitions of µL and µR remain
unchanged, µL = min{λL1, xL+xR2 − α(βR−βL)2(xR−xL) } and µR = max{λR2, xL+xR2 −
α(βR−βL)
2(xR−xL) }. Note that θL − θR = α(βL − βR). It can be shown, that as
long βL = βR and θL = θR = θ, that is the candidates have equal valence, then
(
√
θ−T, T−√θ) will be the candidates’ policy positions in equilibrium. However
when there is a candidate with an advantage, that is (βL, βR) ∈ {(1, 0), (0, 1)},
then the set of optimal strategies for the candidates changes. From this point
onward, I will assume that candidate R is the advantaged candidate, so that
βL = 0 < 1 = βR and θR − θL = α.
First, consider the strategies of the advantaged candidate, R. Let bxR(xL) ≤bbxR(xL) denote the values of xR ∈ XR such that s(BL|xL, xR) = s(BR|xL, xR)8 .
8For example if xL ∈ (
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As before, it can be shown that for xR ∈ (bxR(xL), bbxR(xL)), s(BL|xL, xR) <
s(BR|xL, xR) so that the best response set for candidateR given xL is (bxR(xL), bbxR(xL)).
Given that θL < θR, there exists an interval of xR ∈ XR such that s(BL|xL, xR) <
s(BR|xL, xR) for all xL ∈ XL. That is, there exists a set of policy positions
for which candidate R always wins the election. Let ZR = (bzR,bbzR) denote this
interval9 .
bzR =r(pθL − T )2 − α(1− a)
a
(2.21)







T (1 + a)− 2√θL
1− a (2.22)
Now, consider the strategies of the disadvantaged candidate, L. For xR ∈
XR\ZR, there exists xL ∈ XL that solve s(BL|xL, xR) = s(BR|xL, xR), de-
noted bxL(xR) and bbxL(xR), and when xL ∈ (bxL(xR), bbxL(xR)) s(BL|xL, xR) >
s(BR|xL, xR). However, when xR ∈ ZR, the best response set for candidate L
is his/her entire strategy set XL, since πL(xL, xR) = 0 for all xL ∈ XL.
Proposition 4 (x∗L, x
∗
R) is a Nash Equilibrium of the election game (with α >
0) if and only if x∗R ∈ ZR while the equilibrium strategy of the disadvantaged
candidate is unrestricted. Also, the advantaged candidate can afford to be more
centrist or extremist than his opponent and win the election.
Note that for the disadvantaged candidate, xL =
√
θL−T is the only strategy
to survive iterated deletion of weakly dominant strategies. Now restricting focus
to equilibria in which neither candidate plays a weakly dominant strategy, that
is x∗R ∈ ZR and x∗L =
√
θL−T , it can be shown that bzR ≤ T−√θR ≤ T−√θL ≤
9 bzR,bbzR are the values of xR ∈ XR such that s(BL|qθL − σ20−T, xR) = s(BR|qθL − σ20−
T, xR). S(BL) reaches its maximum at xL =
q
θL − σ20 − T .
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bbzR. In other words, the advantaged candidate can be closer to or further away
from the mean policy position of the median voter and win the election. The
size of the set ZR varies with θR− θL = α. As the importance of candidate
valence to voters diminishes, α→ 0, both bzR and bbzR converge to T −√θL.
2.4 Campaign Advertising
Campaign advertising is one of the many means by which candidates inform
the electorate of their policy preferences. Campaign advertising can also affect
voters’ perceptions of candidates’ honesty and competency. The information
released by candidates during the campaign can be to the point or vague and
imprecise. Not only will candidates differ on their preferred policies but they
may also differ by reputation. One can argue that an incumbent’s constituents
will have a clearer picture of his/her views than they would a challenger who is
new to the political arena. First, I look at an election game in which candidates
spend campaign funds in order to improve their image, that is, affect their
valence in the eyes of voters. The size of their respective war chests determines
who has the advantage in the simultaneous move location game. Second, I will
look at the election game in which candidates spend campaign funds in order to
inform voters about their policy positions. The size of their war chests allows
the candidates to reduce the variance associated with their policy choices.
2.4.1 Image Advertising
Let Wc denote the size of candidate c’s campaign war chest. Let ui(xc, x) =
uo+α0βc+αc−(xc−x)2 so that Eui(µi, xc) = u0+αβc+αc−v(µi)−(µc−µi)2.
Suppose that αc = h(Wc), where h0(Wc) > 0. This implies that θR− θL =
α0 + (αR − αL). Let (αR, αL) be the outcome of the candidates’ fund-raising
efforts and let γ = α0 + (αR − αL). If γ > 0, it follows from our analysis in the
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previous section that πR = 1 and that there exists a set of equilibria in which
x∗R ∈ ZR(γ)10 and x∗L ∈ XL. Similarly if γ < 0, πR = 0 and that there exists





θ−T, T−√θ). In the first stage, the disadvantaged candidate will
have to raise substantially more campaign funds than his opponent in order to
win. Also, if the valence-advantaged candidate has a larger war chest than his
opponent, he can afford to be even more centrist or extremist than his opponent,
as bbzR − bzR increases with γ.
2.4.2 Policy Advertising
Let gc(xc|τ c, µc) be the distribution of the candidate’s preferred policy over
Xc, where µc and τ c are the mean and variance of candidate c’s distribution,
respectively. µc represents the policy that candidate c claims he/she will imple-
ment once elected while τ c reflects voter uncertainty about what the candidate
can and will do once in office. We could also interpret τ c as a measure of the
candidate’s credibility.
Agent i’s expected utility if candidate c wins the election after proposing
policy xc is





ui(xc, x)fi(x|µi)gc(xc|τ c, µc)dxdxc (2.23)
Substituting for ui(xc, x), we get





(x− xc)2fi(x|µi)gc(xc|τ c, µc)dxdxc
Eui(µi, τ c, µc) = u0 + αβc − v(µi)− τ c − (µc − µi)2 (2.24)
10The set ZR varies with γ. As γ diminishes so does the size of the set.
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The differences in expected utility between candidate proposals if candidate
proposals are (xL, xR)
Eui(µi, τL, µL)−Eui(µi, τR, µR) = α(βL−βR)+(τR−τL)+(µR−µi)2−(µL−µi)2
(2.25)





(xc − x)2fi(x|µi, vi)gc(xc|τ c, µc)dxdxc > θc (2.26)
where θc = u0 + αβc − τ c−u. Once again, I assume that candidate R has the
advantage in valence. So since µL ≤ µR, voter i will vote for candidate L if
M = µR−µL2 − α−(τR−τL)2(µR−µL) > µi and
v(µi) + (µL − µi)2 ≤ θL
Agent i will vote for candidate R if
M = µR−µL2 − α−(τR−τL)2(µR−µL) < µi and
v(µi) + (µR − µi)2 ≤ θR
Finally agent i will abstain if
v(µi) + (µL − µi)2 > θc for c = L,R
As before, I define λc1 and λc2 (λc1 ≥ λc2) as before as the roots of the equa-
tion v(µi) + (µc−µi)2− θc = 0, c = L.R. Also, I redefine µL = max{λL2,−T}
and µL = min{λL1,M}. Also µR = max{λR2,M} and µR = min{λR1, T}. So
s(BL), the size of the interval BL = [µL, µL], is now a function of µL, µR, τR
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and τL. τR and τL are functions of campaign advertising expenditures, that
is, τR = τ(WR) and τL = τ(WL). Also, ∂τc∂Wc < 0, that is a candidate’s expendi-
ture on advertising that promotes his/her own policy position reduces the size
of the variance of the candidate’s distribution. With θR− θL = α− (τR − τL),
it is straightforward to see that the disadvantaged candidate will have to raise
substantially more campaign funds than his opponent in order to reduce his
variance enough to offset the valence gap to win the election. So if we view the
advantaged candidate as an incumbent with a favorable political past facing a
challenger, the challenger must be clearer and more outspoken about his policy
position in order to improve his chances of electoral success - a difficult prospect
for an inexperienced politician.
2.5 Conclusion
If we indeed live in a world were people with extreme political views are rigid
in their beliefs and are more likely to participate in elections, this might be the
reason why we do not observe purely centrist politicians. In this paper I have
shown that under certain conditions a positive relationship between extremism
and conviction can lead candidates away from the median of the electorate
without appealing to divergence in candidates’ preferences. They do not locate
at the political extremes either. Rather than share a base by adopting the
median position, the candidates mirror each other in distance from the median
and establish their own base of voters. Incorporating candidate asymmetry
through differences in valence resulted in the strategy of the disadvantaged
candidate being unrestricted. Meanwhile, the advantaged candidate can afford
to be more centrist or extremist than his opponent in order to win the election.
Through campaign advertising, the candidate with the valence disadvantage
can level the playing field providing he/she has sufficient campaign funds. It
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would be interesting to see how the results would change if there was uncertainty
about the mean policy position of the median voter or if asymmetries in voter
preferences and confidence along the issue space were introduced. It might
also be fruitful to extend the model to analyze the possible trade off between










For many types of electoral offices the recruitment and retention policies of
political parties play a key role in determining the quality of those eventually
elected to serve. Potential politicians compare the returns to a career in public
life to the returns of their other options. The attractiveness of the political arena
along with the incentives provided by political parties affect the composition of
the candidate pool from which voters select their elected officials. Term limits
alter the returns to holding a particular office, thus affecting the career decisions
of potential candidates. The interaction of term limits and the recruitment
and retention policies of political parties will invariably impact the decision of
individuals to seek public office.
Generally, the impact of term limits can be broken down into three forms
- behavioral, institutional and compositional. The behavioral consequences of
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term limits concern changes in the attitudes and priorities of legislators. Insti-
tutional consequences involve changes in the influence and balance of power of
the various political actors, for example the relative power of the state legislature
with respect to that of the executive branch. Finally, the compositional conse-
quences involve the changes in the characteristics of individuals who seek and
are elected to public office. Besides being an ongoing policy debate, term limits
have been widely implemented. In the U.S., many state executive branches are
term-limited positions.
This paper is primarily concerned with the compositional consequences of
term limits on the quality of individuals who seek public office. Term limits
reduce both the costs and benefits of being in office so the overall effect of term
limits appears ambiguous. Individuals also differ in their benefits and costs of
holding public office. Term limits could potentially magnify these differences.
Another matter for consideration is the fact that term limits reduce the ability
of voters to retain high-quality politicians.
The contributions of this paper are two-fold. First, I identify withing a
stylized model the conditions under which term limits have positive effects on
the quality or competence of those politicians who are recruited by parties to
run for office. Specifically, I examine the reaction of would-be politicians to
changes in the reward structure of the political sector due to term limits. Second,
I examine the impact that differences in political party retention policies have
on the effect that term limits have on the expected ability of those who choose
political careers.
In the absence of term limits, I assume that incumbents enjoy an advantage
over would be challengers, as their abilities are public knowledge. However,
high-ability incumbents are not guaranteed retention by their political parties.
Finally, political parties have better information about the ability of the candi-
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dates than the electorate, and joining a political party increases the probability
that an individual’s ability will be revealed publicly. Term limits increase the
probability of entry by those of lesser quality, and under certain conditions term
limits reduce the average quality of those entering the political sector.
3.2 Related Literature
The model presented here is related to literature on citizen-candidates put for-
ward by Osborne and Slivinski (1996), and Besley and Coate (1997). Besley and
Coate provide the general framework for such models in which a community se-
lects a single representative to choose policy for a single period and citizens differ
by policy preferences, preferences over candidates and their competence. Their
framework provides insight into questions of the number and characteristics of
those who choose to run, the possibility of "spoiler" candidates and the quality
of elected officials. Osborne and Slivinski focus on predicting the number of
candidates who run for office under plurality rule and when there is a two-ballot
run-off system. In both papers, candidates differ in their positions over a policy
space.
The model presented is also related to that of Carillo and Mariotti (2001),
Mao (2001), Chen and Niou (2005), Messner and Polborn (2004), and Caselli
and Morelli (2004), the last two being single-period models. Carillo and Mar-
iotti present a model in which the objectives of political parties and agents
diverge, and the strategies of political parties provide an imperfect signal about
the quality of candidates. Political parties may not choose the best available
candidate, but chose the candidate with the highest probability of winning based
on performance in the electoral campaign. The result is suboptimal politician
turnover from the perspective of voters. In this framework, term limits in-
crease the opportunity cost of keeping an incumbent, reducing conservatism in
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candidate replacement.
Mao uses two alternative series of two-party campaign games - one with
longer tenure and no term limits and another with a shorter tenure created
by term limits - to explain the seemingly inconsistent behavior of voters who
re-elect incumbents while supporting term limits. The total benefits derived
from the incumbent is increasing in his/her seniority, however, after some point
the average benefits derived by the incumbent’s base of support declines as the
incumbent seeks wider appeal. The incumbent’s supporters thus vote for term
limits because after this point the average benefits accruing to them dip below
that which would be derived from a newcomer from the same political party
as the incumbent. With a similar objective to Mao, Chen and Niou present a
multi-period spatial model and conclude that term limits or the threat of term
limits improves the responsiveness of politicians with respect to their policy
platforms.
In Messner and Polborn’s model citizens vary in competency and opportunity
costs. They focus on the impact of office characteristics, such as wages and
election costs, on entry decisions. Caselli and Morelli present a citizen-candidate
model in which candidates differ in quality. Their key assumption is that low-
quality candidates have lower market wages than high-quality candidates and
thus have a comparative advantage in seeking public office. Both papers show
that low-quality candidates are more likely to run for office. However, Caselli
and Morelli’s model does not allow those seeking office to internalize the effect of
their running for office on the quality of the candidate pool since the quality of
the candidate elected does not impact the quality of the public good provided.
Smart and Sturm (2006) present an infinite horizon political agency model
consisting of both public-spirited and selfish politicians, in which two-term lim-
its induce truthful behavior by politicians and raise expected welfare for voters
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when discount rates are sufficiently low and the proportion of public-interested
politicians is high. In Matozzi and Merlo’s (2007a) reduced-form model of party
recruitment of politicians, political skills are important in the public and private
sectors, but are imperfectly observed by private sector employers. The infor-
mational asymmetry between parties and private sector employers results in an
inverse relationship between the degree of transparency in politics and the aver-
age quality of politicians recruited by the parties. Thus increasing transparency
is not welfare improving.
Reed and Schansberg (1994) and Franklin and Westin (1998) simulate the
effect of term limits on average seniority and retirement rates. They conclude
that term limits will reduce the average tenure and seniority of representatives,
but the net effect on the attractiveness of holding office will be ambiguous and
will depend on the relative size of the impact of shorter tenure and reduced
influence of special interests versus the impact of shorter waiting times for com-
mittee and leadership positions. They also predict an increase in turnover rates
and that groups with lower current turnover rates, such as minorities, will be
disproportionately adversely affected by term limits. One major problem with
their analysis, as is the case with Franklin and Westin, stems from their main
assumption that election and continuation rates will remain constant at the lev-
els of pre-term limit elections, when in fact term limits themselves could impact
continuation rates. Also, it is not obvious that the influence of special interests
will be reduced under term limits. There are opposing factors at work here.
The impact of the increased inexperience of legislators relative to lobbyists must
be weighed against the impact of lowering the obligations of the legislators to
special interest due to shorter tenures.
Diermeier, Keane and Merlo (2005) examine returns to a career in the
U.S. Congress using a stochastic dynamic model of optimal career choices.
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Their model takes into account both pecuniary and non-pecuniary rewards from
congressional experience, including post-congressional employment, while re-
election probabilities do not depend on the policy choices of incumbents but
on other characteristics. They argue that running for a particular office may
be better understood as an intermediate objective to realize other goals and
find that unobserved skills such as valence and charisma play an important role
in electoral success. However, they find little evidence of a link between these
unobservable political skills and the outside options of candidates. Their results
suggest that term limits will result in early voluntary exit by incumbents and
a reduction in the value of congressional seats, where those most negatively
affected will be those with better political skills. Carey et al (2003) find that
term limits have no effect on the demographic or ideological composition of the
people elected to office.
3.3 Model
Each period, t = 0, 1..., a large community of infinitely living agents elects a
public official to provide a public good. The public official is chosen from a
set of candidates recruited by political parties each period. All agents discount
time with the common discount factor β < 1.
3.3.1 Politicians
Each period t, a set Mt of agents of measure one become eligible to hold public
office1. Prior to this, these individuals have been working in the private sector.
Members of this set are henceforth referred to as politicians. Each politician
has two periods of eligibility for public life. Politicians differ in their ability,
represented by the parameter θ ∈ R++. Let θk denote the ability of politician
1Many countries have minimum age of candidacy restrictions for elected government offices.
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k, k ∈ Mt. θ has probability distribution G(θ) on R++, with g(θ) being the
corresponding density function.
In a politician’s first period of eligibility for public life, the skill of the politi-
cian is known to the politician but is imperfectly observed by private sector
employers and the political parties prior to their recruitment. Politician k’s
private sector compensation, wk, is perfectly observed by the political party
but not by voters. The politician’s private sector compensation represents an
imperfect signal of the ability of the politician. Specifically, wk = θk+ε, where
ε is a normally distributed random variable with E[ε] = 0 and var[ε] = σ2ε.
We can interpret σ2ε as a measure of the degree with which the market accu-
rately accesses individual ability prior to public office eligibility. Let L(w|θ) be
the conditional distribution of w given θ, and l(w|θ) the corresponding density
function. It follows that w conditional on θ is normally distributed, so that
l(w|θ) satisfies the monotone likelihood ratio property (i.e. if θ > θ0, then the
ratio l(w|θ)/l(w|θ0) is strictly increasing in w). The probability of recruitment
depends on the recruitment policies of the political parties which are discussed
in the section 3.3.2.
If politician k is successfully recruited by political party p and becomes a
candidate, he receives compensation wp. If politician k is successfully elected to
public office, k’s ability is revealed publicly. If politician k is unsuccessful in the
election, k’s ability is revealed publicly with probability δ ∈ (0, 1). δ represents
the informational benefit of electoral campaigns. Provided that k is retained
by the party, the incumbent k must decide in the following period whether to
seek re-election, or to return to the private sector. Whether k returns to the
private sector or is successfully elected to a second term, k receives compensation
θk. However, due to seniority in public office, k receives an additional payoff
according to the function r for remaining in public office. The function r may
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include non-pecuniary rewards, such as committee membership, positions of
leadership and legislative achievements or any other rewards to seniority in the
political sector. Specifically, r(θ) = c + dθ, where c > 0 and d > 0, that is
the rewards of seniority are linear and increasing in ability. Also, I assume that
d > 2β . Therefore, given the opportunity all incumbents wish to remain in office.
Finally, I assume that there are no direct costs to running for office.
If k chooses not to join the party or is not recruited by the party, then
k remains in the private sector during the first period of eligibility, forfeits
eligibility in the next period and receives private sector compensation wk in the
first period of eligibility. In the following period, with probability γ, k’s ability
is revealed in the private sector and k receives compensation θk. Otherwise k
continues to receive private sector compensation, wk. I assume that γ < δ, that
is, the probability that an individual’s true type is publicly revealed at the end
of the period is greater if they choose the political sector than if they remained
in the private sector.
Let V (w, θ) denote the present value of expected lifetime earnings for a
politician if he remains in the private sector given private sector compensation
w and ability θ. I assume that voters do not observe candidate abilities (except
in the case of incumbents), nor do voters observe the private sector compensation
of the candidates. That is, excluding incumbent politicians, voters view all other
candidates as identical. Therefore the probability of electoral success in the first
period of eligibility for any politician is independent of the politician’s ability.
Let π denote this probability. However, the probability that an incumbent
politician is retained is very much dependent on the politician’s revealed ability.
Let η(θI) denote the probability that an incumbent is retained by his/her party
and by the voters for a second term, given that the incumbent’s ability is θI .
Note that η(θI) will depend on both the retention policies of political parties,
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as well as that of voters which will be discussed in sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3,
respectively. Let µ(θI) denote the retention policy of a political party with
an incumbent of ability θI , where µ(θI) = 1 denotes the party retaining the
incumbent and µ(θI) = 0 denotes the party choosing to recruit a new candidate.
Let σ(θI) denote the optimal retention strategy of voters when an incumbent of
ability θI is retained, where σ(θI) = 1 denotes voters reelecting the incumbent
and σ(θI) = 0 denotes voters electing the challenger. Therefore, π = 12 in the
absence of an incumbent, and π = µ(θI)(1−σ(θI))+ 12(1−µ(θI)) when the other
party has an incumbent with ability θI . Let Vp(w, θ) denote the present value
of expected lifetime earnings for a politician if he chooses to join political party p
given private sector compensation w and ability θ. Finally, let V (θ) = V (θ, θ).
It can be shown that
V (w, θ) =
w + γβV (θ)






Vp(w, θ) = wp + β [π (V (θ) + η(θ)r(θ)) + (1− π) (δV (θ) + (1− δ)V (w, θ))]
(3.3)
The decision to enter the political sector for a policitian with ability θ,
depends on whether the politician’s private sector compensation is low enough.
Specifically, if wk ≤ α(wp + πβη(θk)r(θk)) + (1− α)θk then politician k wishes




1− β(1− π)(1− δ) (3.4)
Given my assumptions on δ and γ, it can be shown that 0 < α1 < 1. Let
w(θk) = α1(wp + πβη(θk)r(θk)) + (1 − α1)θk. w(θk) represent the minimum
wage politician k would need to receive in the private sector in order to wish to
remain in the private sector. Also, Φ0,σ2ε(w(θ) − θ) is the probability that an
individual of quality θ would prefer to enter the political sector.
Effect of Term Limits on Political Ambition
In my model term limits reduce the eligibility to hold public office to one period.
Therefore, there are no incumbents. This eliminates the existence of senior
elected officials. For now let us assume that this also eliminates non-pecuniary
rewards based on seniority. Let V Lp (w, θ) denote the present value of expected
lifetime earnings for a politician if he chooses to join political party p given
private sector compensation w and ability θ when term limits are imposed. If
term limits completely eliminate the benefits of seniority in holding public office,
while still allowing the politician to reveal his/her true ability after serving one
term then,
V Lp (w, θ) = wp +
1
2
β [V (θ) + (δV (θ) + (1− δ)V (w, θ))] (3.5)
The decision to enter the political sector for a policitian with ability θ is altered.




1− β2 (1− δ)
(3.6)
Now let us compare the decision to enter the political sector and run for an
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open-seat elections with or without term limits. In the case of an open-seat,
α1 = α2.
Proposition 5 If term limits completely eliminate the benefits of seniority,
then the imposition of term limits lowers the minimum compensation an eli-
gible individual would require to remain in the private sector. Moreover, term
limits would lower the probability politicians of all abilities wishing to enter the
political sector. Among those individuals who would have been re-elected for a
second term in the absence of term limits, the reduction in probability of entering
the political sector is increasing in the ability of the politician.
Proof. Let wL (θ) denote the minimum compensation an individual with ability
θ would need to remain in the private sector when term limits are implemented.
First, w (θ) = α1(wp +
β
2 η(θ)r(θ)) + (1 − α1)θ ≥ α1wp + (1 − α1)θ = wL (θ).
Now, Φ0,σ2ε(w
L(θ) − θ) is the probability that an individual of quality θ would
prefer to enter the political sector under term limits.
w (θ) ≥ wL (θ)⇒ Φ0,σ2ε(w(θ)− θ)− Φ0,σ2ε(wL(θ)− θ) ≥ 0

















Therefore, for θ, θ0 such that η(θ) = η(θ0) = 1, θ > θ0 implies that
Φ0,σ2ε(w(θ)− θ)−Φ0,σ2ε(wL(θ)− θ) ≥ Φ0,σ2ε(w(θ0)− θ0)−Φ0,σ2ε(wL(θ0)− θ0)
The proposition states that of those politicians that would be retained by
both voters and their political party, those of higher ability are more adversely
affected by this particular restructuring of rewards in the political sector as a
result of the implementation of term limits. Now suppose that term limits bring
forward the benefits of seniority in holding public office, while still allowing the
politician to reveal his/her true ability after serving one term then,
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β [V (θ) + (δV (θ) + (1− δ)V (w, θ))] (3.7)
The decision to enter the political sector for a policitian with ability θ is now
wk ≤ α1(wp + 12r(θk)) + (1− α1)θk.
Proposition 6 If term limits bring forward the benefits of seniority, then the
imposition of term limits would raise the minimum compensation an eligible
individual would require to remain in the private sector. Moreover, among those
individuals who would not have been re-elected for a second term in the absence
of term limits, the increase in the probability of entering the political sector is
increasing in the ability of the politician.









Φ0,σ2ε(w(θ)− θ)− Φ0,σ2ε(wL(θ)− θ) ≤ 0.









L(θ)− θ) £d2 − 1¤+ φ0,σ2ε(w(θ)− θ)i ≤ 0
Therefore, for θ, θ0 such that η(θ) = η(θ0) = 0, θ > θ0 implies that
Φ0,σ2ε(w(θ)− θ)−Φ0,σ2ε(wL(θ)− θ) ≤ Φ0,σ2ε(w(θ0)− θ0)−Φ0,σ2ε(wL(θ0)− θ0)
Proposition 6 states that of those politicians that would not be retained by
either voters or their political party, those of higher ability are more positively
affected by the imposition of term limits. The actual impact of term limits
on the structure of these non-pecuniary rewards may lie somewhere in between
these two cases. By eliminating a senior class, the elected officials may be forced
to compete with a larger group of elected officials of similar rank. Therefore
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the elected officials may on average receive less than r(θ) for holding office. Let
λ ∈ (0, 1) denote the probability of an elected official receiving these rewards. λ,
for example, may reflect the type of elected office (e.g. executive or legislative),
size of the legislature, the number of available committee positions, or the level
of competition for these rewards2. Incorporating λ,
V Lp (w, θ) = wp+λπr(θ)+β [πV (θ) + (1− π) (δV (θ) + (1− δ)V (w, θ))] (3.8)
Now, w(θ) = α1(wp+
βη(θ)








Proposition 7 If term limits bring forward the benefits of seniority so that
an elected official receives reward r with probability λ, then the imposition of
term limits would raise the minimum compensation an eligible individual with
ability θ would require to remain in the private sector if λ > βη(θ). Therefore,
term limits would raise the probability of entering the political sector for this
individual. However, if λ ≤ βη(θ), then the imposition of term limits lowers
the minimum compensation an eligible individual would require to remain in the
private sector and lowers the probability of entering the political sector for this
individual.
How the restructuring of benefits of seniority affects the impact of term limits
have on individuals of varying abilities depends on the retention policies of polit-
ical parties and voters. Note that if λ > β, then the introduction of term limits
would increase the probability of entering the political sector for individuals of
all abilities. The relationship between η(θ) and θ is not necessarily monotone
increasing. Two factors come into play. First the incumbent must be retained
2 It an alternative model, r could be constant, with λ depending on the politician’s ability.
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by the incumbent party. There are reasons that a party may not wish to retain
a high-ability incumbent. The party must weigh the net benefit of retaining
the incumbent over the expected net benefit of a new recruit. New recruits
may prove to be less expensive, with a higher net benefit than a high-ability
incumbent. Similarly, the party may not wish to retain a low-ability incumbent.
Second, the incumbent must be re-elected by voters. The incumbent’s revealed
ability must be higher than the expected ability of a challenger. This second fac-
tor obviously favours high-ability incumbents for re-election. The next section
outlines possible recruitment and retention policies of political parties.
3.3.2 Political Party Recruitment and Retention
For simplicity, the recruitment policies of the political parties are exogenously
determined. These policies take two forms in this paper. Let Ψ denote the
set of private sector compensations, such that if wk ∈ Ψ, a political party
will wish to recruit politician k. Under the first policy, potential recruits are
accepted by the party if their private sector compensation exceeds a cut-off, w∗,
that is Ψ = [w∗,∞). In an alternative recruitment policy, potential recruits
are accepted by the party if their private sector compensation falls within the
interval, that is Ψ = [w,w].
Let f(θ|w) denote the probability distribution of θ conditional on private-





















Suppose that the retention policies of the political parties for incumbents,
after their abilities have been publicly revealed take the form
µ(θI) =
 1 if θ ∈ [θL, θH ]0 otherwise (P1)
where θH ≥ θ under both recruitment policies.
Alternatively, suppose that the retention policies of the political parties for
incumbents, after their abilities have been publicly revealed take the form
µ(θI) =





Voters care about maximizing the resources available for the provision of a
public good. The ability and tenure of a politician directly affects the size of
the effective budget the politician has for providing the public good in each
period. Let m denote tenure, that is, the number of completed terms in office,
where m ∈ {0, 1}. The ability of a politician is inversely related to the cost
of providing the public goods. Specifically, if a politician with ability θ and
tenure m is elected as the public official, the size of the effective per period
budget is B(θ,m), where B is increasing in both arguments. Let Fo(θ) denote
the distribution of abilities of candidates for an open seat election, with fo(θ) the
corresponding density function. Let θc denote the ability of the challenger in an
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incumbent-challenger election. Let Fc(θc|θ) denote the distribution of abilities
of challengers for an incumbent-challenger election conditional on the incumbent
having ability θ, with fc(θc|θ) the corresponding density function. Fo(θ) and
Fc(θc|θ) will of course depend on the recruitment policies of the parties during
an open-seat election, and the challenger’s party during an incumbent-challenger
election, as well as the distribution of abilities for those eligible individuals who
prefer to enter the political sector, as discussed in the previous sections3.
Let W (θ) denote the expected discounted budget for the provision of the
public good in the event of an incumbent-challenger election at the beginning of
the period before the incumbent’s party has made its retention decision when
the incumbent is of ability θ. Let W0 denote the expected discounted budget
for the provision of the public good in the event of an open-seat election. With




[B(θ, 0) + βW (θ)] fo(θ)dθ (3.12)
Also,
W (θ) = µ(θ)
Z
Θ
max {B(θ, 1) + βW (θ), B(θc, 1) + βW (θc)} fc(θc|θ)dθc
+(1− µ(θ))W0 (3.13)
Voters will re-elect an incumbent if the incumbent’s revealed ability is as
least as high as bθ, where bθ is such that
B(bθ, 1) = Z
Θ
[B(θc, 1) + βW (θc)]fc(θc|bθ)dθc − βW0 (3.14)
3Φ0,σ2ε
(w(θ)− θ) RΨ f(θ|w)dw is the distribution of abilities of those entering the political
sector and recruited by the political parties.
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It can be shown that bθ < θ, that is the cut-off for the re-election for an incumbent
is slightly less than the expected ability of a new recruit, because of the value
that voters assign to tenure. So,
σ (θ) =





Suppose that the retention policy of the political parties for incumbents follows
P1. Let θ∗ = max{θL,bθ}. Then the probability of retention of an incumbent
with ability θ by his/her party and the voters for an incumbent of type θ is
η (θ) =




Proposition 7 can now be restated.
Proposition 8 Suppose that λ < β. If term limits bring forward the benefits
of seniority so that an elected official receives reward r(θ) with probability λ,
then the imposition of term limits would lower the minimum compensation an
eligible individual with ability θ ∈ [θ∗, θH ] would require to remain in the pri-
vate sector. Therefore, term limits would lower the probability of candidacy for
these individuals. For eligible individuals with ability θ ∈ [0, θ∗)∪ (θH ,∞), then
the imposition of term limits raises the minimum compensation these individu-
als would require to remain in the private sector and raises their probability of
candidacy.
Proof. First, for θ ∈ [θ∗, θH ],
w(θ) = α1(wp+
β






+(1−α1)θ = wL (θ),




Now for θ ∈ [0, θ∗) ∪ (θH ,∞),






+ (1− α1)θ = wL (θ),
⇒ £Φ0,σ2ε(w(θ)− θ)− Φ0,σ2ε(wL(θ)− θ)¤ R
Ψ
f(θ|w)dw ≤ 0.
Proposition 8 implies that the implementation of term limits and the sub-
sequent restructuring of rewards leads to more individuals of the highest and
lowest abilities wishing to enter the political sector. The impact of term lim-
its on the expected ability of those entering the political sector appears to be
ambiguous, as it would depend on the distribution of ability types across the
population. However, under certain circumstances4, those of the highest abil-
ity benefit more from term limits. Under these conditions, term limits would
improve the average quality of individuals seeking a political career.
Suppose that the retention policy of the political parties for incumbents
follows P2. Let θ∗∗ = max{eθ,bθ}. Then the probability of retention of an
incumbent with ability θ by his/her party and the voters for an incumbent of
type θ is
η (θ) =




Proposition 7 can be restated again.
Proposition 9 Suppose that λ < β. If term limits bring forward the benefits of
seniority so that an elected official receives reward r(θ) with probability λ, then
the imposition of term limits would lower the minimum compensation an eligi-
ble individual with ability θ ≥ θ∗ would require to remain in the private sector.
Therefore, term limits would lower the probability of candidacy for these indi-
viduals. For eligible individuals with ability θ < θ∗, the imposition of term limits

















the private sector and raises their probability of candidacy.
Proof. First for θ ≥ θ∗∗,
w(θ) = α1(wp+
β






+(1−α1)θ = wL (θ),
⇒ £Φ0,σ2ε(w(θ)− θ)− Φ0,σ2ε(wL(θ)− θ)¤ R
Ψ
f(θ|w)dw ≥ 0.
Then for θ < θ∗∗,






+ (1− α1)θ = wL (θ),
⇒ £Φ0,σ2ε(w(θ)− θ)− Φ0,σ2ε(wL(θ)− θ)¤ R
Ψ
f(θ|w)dw ≤ 0.
Proposition 9 implies that the implementation of term limits and the sub-
sequent restructuring of rewards leads to more individuals of lower abilities
wishing to enter the political sector, while reducing the probability of entry for
individuals of higher ability.
3.5 Conclusion
When term limits completely eliminate the benefits to seniority, those of higher
ability are more adversely affected and less likely to enter the political arena. In
the early 1990’s, reformists in several states in the U.S. were successful in passing
referenda on term limits for their federal government legislators. Although these
limitations were later ruled unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court, had
they remained in effect, one could argue that they would have put congressmen
from these states at a disadvantage in gaining key committee memberships or
chairmanships or some of the other perks often associated with a long tenure
in Congress. The results in this paper suggest that the expected ability of
individuals who would be attracted to serving in Congress for states with such
term limitations would be adversely affected by term limits.
If term limits restructure rewards to a political career, such that those re-
wards previously reserved for senior public officials are attainable, or at least
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partially attainable, then it is possible for term limits to lead to an improvement
in the expected quality of those seeking entry to the political sector. However,
even if such a restructuring were to occur, when political parties only place a
lower bound on the ability of incumbents they wish to retain, the implementa-
tion of term limits will unambiguously reduce the expected ability of entrants







Many electoral systems consist of several different levels of political positions,
ranging from lower level positions such as municipal or provincial government
legislators to upper level positions such as federal government legislators. Often,
in order to increase the probability of holding an upper level political position
one must be elected to and perform well in a lower level position. It seems
intuitive that over time one should be better able to determine the quality
of politicians the longer they hold their positions. Past outcomes become a
better indicator of the ability of the incumbent. It becomes easier for voters
to identify and remove politicians of lesser ability. Such an electoral system
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should inherently favour high-ability politicians to advance to high-level political
positions.
Generally, the impact of term limits can be broken down into three forms
- behavioral, institutional and compositional. The behavioral consequences of
term limits concern changes in the attitudes and priorities of legislators. In-
stitutional consequences involve changes in the influence and balance of power
of the various political actors, for example the relative power of the state legis-
lature with respect to that of the executive branch. Finally, the compositional
consequences involve the changes in the characteristics of individuals who seek
and are elected to public office. Besides being a topic of policy debates, term
limits have been widely implemented.
Potential politicians consider the returns to a career in public life to the
returns of their other options. The attractiveness of the political arena along
with the incentives provided by political parties affect the composition of the
candidate pool from which voters select their elected officials. Term limits alter
the returns to holding a particular office, thus affecting the career decisions of
potential candidates. Term limits increase turnover and reduce the seniority
of elected officials, and may reduce the time taken to advance up the political
ladder.
This paper focuses on the impact of placing term limitations on lower level
electoral positions on the career paths of politicians. Term limits reduce both
the costs and benefits of being in office so the overall effect of term limits appears
ambiguous. Individuals also differ in their political aptitude - the knowledge
and skills that a political system rewards and requires. Term limits could
potentially these magnify differences.
Another matter for consideration is the fact that term limits reduce the
average seniority of politicians and the length of experience in politics for those
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seeking higher level political positions.Specifically, this paper explores the extent
to which term limits at lower level electoral positions alter the average quality
of those who advance to higher level political positions.
For the most part, term limits improve the expected political skill of those
seeking upper level political positions. However, under certain conditions, term
limits can lead to a reduction in expected quality. Given the reduction in average
seniority and the increase in turnover at the lower levels of the political hierarchy,
this paper also analyzes the trade off between the quality of officeholders at the
lower levels and the quality of office holders at the upper levels. The results
suggest that term limits reduce the expected quality of those in lower level
political positions, without guaranteeing an increase in expected quality at the
upper level.
4.2 Related Literature
The model presented here is closely related to that of Harrington (2000), in
which ambitious and myopic office-seekers climb an electoral system comprised
of a hierarchy of offices. In that case, the purpose was to determine the ex-
tent to which purely office-seeking politicians could be distinguished from pure
ideologues in upper-level political positions, with the main result that time and
advancement to higher office may not reveal the true motivations of those who
govern. Harrington does not explicitly model the choice to enter or exit politics,
run for re-election or run for a higher level political position.
Inspiration was also gained fromMatozzi and Merlo (2007b) which presents a
model of career politicians and individuals with political careers. Career politi-
cians are defined as those who enter politics solely motivated by non-pecuniary
rewards, such as ego rents and legislative success. Individuals with political
careers are those who eventually leave politics in order to pursue the rewards
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of their political experience in the private sector. In their model individuals
are heterogeneous on two dimensions of ability; political skills and ability in
the private sector, with the two being positively correlated. In equilibrium,
individuals with political careers have better political skills relative to career
politicians, who in turn have better political skills than the average in the pop-
ulation.
The model presented here is also related to the literature on citizen-candidates
put forward by Osborne and Slivinski (1996), and Besley and Coate (1997).
Besley and Coate provide the general framework for such models in which a
community selects a single representative to choose policy for a single period
and citizens differ by policy preferences, preferences over candidates and their
competence. Their framework provides insight into questions of the number and
characteristics of those who choose to run, the possibility of "spoiler" candidates
and the quality of elected officials. Osborne and Slivinski focus on predicting the
number of candidates who run for office under plurality rule and when there is
a two-ballot run-off system. In both papers, candidates differ in their positions
over a policy space.
The model is also related to that of Carillo and Mariotti (2001), Mao (2001),
Chen and Niou (2005), Messner and Polborn (2004), and Caselli and Morelli
(2004), the last two being single-period models. Carillo and Mariotti present
a model in which the objectives of political parties and candidates diverge, and
the strategies of political parties provide an imperfect signal about the quality
of candidates. Political parties may not choose the best available candidate,
but chose the candidate with the highest probability of winning based on perfor-
mance in the electoral campaign. The result is suboptimal politician turnover
from the perspective of voters. In this framework, term limits increase the
opportunity cost of keeping an incumbent, reducing the degree of party loyalty
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to incumbents.
Mao uses two alternative series of two-party campaign games - one with
longer tenure and no term limits and another with a shorter tenure created by
term limits - to explain the seemingly inconsistent behavior of voters who re-
elect incumbents while supporting term limits. The total benefits derived from
the incumbent is increasing in his/her seniority. The incumbent’s supporters
thus vote for term limits because after this point the average benefits accruing
to them dip below that which would be derived from a newcomer from the same
political party as the incumbent. With a similar objective to Mao, Chen and
Niou present a multi-period spatial model and conclude that term limits or the
threat of term limits improves the responsiveness of politicians with respect to
their policy platforms.
In Messner and Polborn’s model citizens vary in competency and opportunity
costs. They focus on the impact of office characteristics, such as wages and
election costs, on entry decisions. Caselli and Morelli present a citizen-candidate
model in which candidates differ in quality. Their key assumption is that low-
quality candidates have lower market wages than high-quality candidates and
thus have a comparative advantage in seeking public office. Both papers show
that low-quality candidates are more likely to run for office. However, Caselli
and Morelli’s model does not allow those seeking office to internalize the effect of
their running for office on the quality of the candidate pool since the quality of
the candidate elected does not impact the quality of the public good provided.
Smart and Sturm (2006) present an infinite horizon political agency model
consisting of both public-spirited and selfish politicians, in which two-term lim-
its induce truthful behavior by politicians and raise expected welfare for voters
when discount rates are sufficiently low and the proportion of public-interested
politicians is high. In Matozzi and Merlo’s (2007a) reduced-form model of party
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recruitment of politicians, political skills are important in the public and private
sectors, but are imperfectly observed by private sector employers. The infor-
mational asymmetry between parties and private sector employers results in an
inverse relationship between the degree of transparency in politics and the aver-
age quality of politicians recruited by the parties. Thus increasing transparency
is not welfare improving.
Reed and Schansberg (1994) and Franklin and Westin (1998) simulate the
effect of term limits on average seniority and retirement rates. They conclude
that term limits will reduce the average tenure and seniority of representatives,
but the net effect on the attractiveness of holding office will be ambiguous and
will depend on the relative size of the impact of shorter tenure and reduced
influence of special interests versus the impact of shorter waiting times for com-
mittee and leadership positions. They also predict an increase in turnover rates
and that groups with lower current turnover rates, such as minorities, will be
disproportionately adversely affected by term limits. One major problem with
their analysis, as is the case with Franklin and Westin, stems from their main
assumption that election and continuation rates will remain constant at the lev-
els of pre-term limit elections, when in fact term limits themselves could impact
continuation rates. Also, it is not obvious that the influence of special interests
will be reduced under term limits. There are opposing factors at work here.
The impact of the increased inexperience of legislators relative to lobbyists must
be weighed against the impact of lowering the obligations of the legislators to
special interest due to shorter tenures.
On the empirical side, Diermeier, Keane and Merlo (2005) examine returns to
a career in the U.S. Congress using a stochastic dynamic model of optimal career
choices. Their model takes into account both pecuniary and non-pecuniary re-
wards from congressional experience, including post-congressional employment,
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while re-election probabilities do not depend on the policy choices of incumbents
but on other characteristics. They argue that running for a particular office may
be better understood as an intermediate objective to realize other goals and find
that unobserved skills such as valence and charisma play an important role in
electoral success. However, they find little evidence of a link between these un-
observable political skills and the outside options of candidates. Their results
suggest that term limits will result in early voluntary exit by incumbents and
a reduction in the value of congressional seats, where those most negatively
affected will be those with better political skills. Carey et al (2003) find that
term limits have no effect on the demographic or ideological composition of the
people elected to office.
4.3 Model
Each period, t = 0, 1..., a large but finite number of individuals is born in a
world consisting of two sectors - a market sector and a political sector. Each
individual lives for two periods. Individuals are heterogeneous with respect to
their abilities across three dimensions - political skill, p ∈ [0, 1], market skill,
m ∈ {0, 1}, and electability, e ∈ {0, 1}. These three abilities determine an
individual’s payoffs in both the political sector and market sector as well as
his or her probability of electoral success. Individual types are defined by their
ability profile a = (p,m, e) ∈ [0, 1]× {0, 1} × {0, 1}. Political skill is defined as
the ability to influence, win support and interact well with others, and is crucial
to success as a politician and legislator. Market skill is a measure of productivity
in the market sector where m = 1(m = 0) denotes an individual with high (low)
market skill. Electability is defined as a characteristic of the individual that
allows him/her to appeal to a wide base of voters where e = 1(e = 0) denotes
an individual with high (low) electability.
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Let F be the distribution function of p, with f as the corresponding density
function. In the beginning individuals receive a signal, q = (π, ε) ∈ {0, 1} ×
{0, 1}, about their abilities in terms of political skill and electability, respectively.
Although the individual does not receive a direct signal about his/her market
skill, market skill and political skill are positively correlated. Specifically, the
probability that an individual with political skill p has market skill m = 1, is
equal to sp, where s ∈ (0, 1). Let F (p|π) denote the distribution of p conditional
on π, with f(p|π) the corresponding density function. The probability that
an individual receives a strong signal of political skill given that his/her true
political skill is p, is increasing in p. Specifically, Prob{π = 1|p} = αp and
α ∈ (0, 1). Therefore,









Finally, the probability that ε = 1, that is, an individual receives a strong
signal of electability, given that his/her true electability is e, is increasing in e.
Specifically,
φ = Prob {ε = 1|e = 1} > Prob {ε = 1|e = 0} = 1− τ and (4.2)
τ = Prob {ε = 0|e = 0} > Prob {ε = 0|e = 1} = 1− φ
The market sector is perfectly competitive with individuals receiving wages
65
according to their productivity. The political sector is characterized by an elec-
toral system that is a two-tiered hierarchy of political positions. These tiers
or levels are numbered 1 and 2, where level 1 offices are a the bottom of the
hierarchy and the level of entry for aspiring politicians. There are large num-
ber of lower level political positions and significantly fewer upper level offices.
Politicians must have served one term in a lower level office in order to run
for an upper level political position. An individual with electability e = 1, is
successfully elected to a lower level position with probability ∂ ∈ (0, 1), and an
upper level position with probability γ ∈ (0, 1), where ∂ > γ. An individual
with electability e = 0 has zero chance of being elected to a political position.
The probabilities ∂ and γ reflect the availability of and the nature of competition
for lower and upper level political positions, respectively.
4.3.1 Timing
In the first period of their lives individuals must choose whether to enter the
market sector or the political sector. For simplicity, I assume that if individuals
choose the market sector in the first period, they will remain in the market sector
for both periods of their lives. If they choose the political sector, they must
campaign for a lower level political position. Over the course of the campaign,
their electability is revealed. If they are successful, the individual spends the
first term in a lower level political position. However, if they fail to be elected
they must spend the remainder of their lives in the market sector. After serving
one period in a lower level political position, an individual’s political skill is
publicly revealed and the choice must be made whether to exit the political
sector for the market sector, campaign for an upper level political position or
to spend another term in the current lower level political position. I assume
that a politician running for a second term in a lower level political position is
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re-elected with probability θ ∈ (0, 1). Let p denote the expected political skill
of a challenger for a lower level political position. In the absence of incumbent
advantage, if voters only care about electing the candidate with the highest
political skill, then
θ =
 1 if p > p0 otherwise (4.3)
Although the individual still does not know his/her market skill after spend-
ing one period in the political sector, market skill m is positively correlated
with political skill, p. So, being elected to one term in a lower level office is
informative for prospects in both sectors. If the individual chooses to campaign
for an upper level political position and is not successful, the last period of life
is spent in the market sector.
For the rest of the paper, politicians will refer to those individuals who chose
to campaign for lower level office in the first period, regardless of their success.
I assume that all individuals discount time by the same discount factor, β < 1.
4.3.2 Market Sector
If individuals with market skill m choose the market sector in the first period
they will remain in the market sector for both periods of their lives and receive
a payoff each period according to the function r0M (m), where the superscript 0
reflects zero political experience1. Diermeier, Keane and Merlo (2005) find that
winning reelection in the House of Representatives for the first time significantly
improves post-congressional earnings in the private sector. So in this model,
experience in the political sector is assumed to enhance productivity in the
market sector. Those with political sector experience are rewarded with a higher
1 It would be reasonable to assume that individuals would be paid according to the expected
market sector ability of those who choose the market sector exclusively.
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market sector payoff in the second period of their lives should they choose to
exit the political sector. Let r1M (m) denote the second period payoff function in
the market sector for an individual with market skill m who exits the political
sector after the first period. Both functions are increasing in m. Specifically,
r0M (m) =




0 if m = 0
w00 if m = 1
(4.5)
where 0 < w < w0 < w00.
4.3.3 Political Sector
A politician with political skill p, who enters the political sector in the first
period and is unsuccessful in getting elected returns to the market sector and
receives a payoff each period according to the function r0P (p). Politicians who
are successfully elected to a lower level office in the first period receive a payoff
in the first period according to the function r1P (p).
Politicians who remain in lower level office for a second term receive an
additional payoff to that received in their first term in office. Let r2P (p) denote
the second period payoff function for a second term in lower level office, where
r2P (p) ≥ r1P (p) for all p. The difference can be interpreted as rewards associated
with senority in the political sector at the lower level. All three functions r2P (p),
r1p(p) and r
0
p(p) are increasing in p. Also, I assume that r
2
P (p) − r1P (p) is
increasing in p. That is, the difference between second term payoffs and first
term payoffs increases with level of political skill. Specifically,
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r0p(p) = bp (4.6)
r1p(p) = c+ dp (4.7)
r2p(p) = g + hp (4.8)
where 0 < b < d < h and c < g. I assume that h > s(w00 − w0), that is,
the marginal return to political skill is higher in the second term in a lower
level political position than the expected marginal return to political skill in the
market sector for an incumbent politician.
Finally, politicians who campaign for an upper level political position and
are unsuccessful exit the political sector and enter the market sector where they
a receive payoff according to the function r1M (m). However, if the are successful
in being elected to an upper level political office, they receive a payoff according
to the function rU (p) = l + kp, where l > 0 and k > 0. Also, I assume that
k > s(w00 − w0), that is, the marginal return to political skill is higher in an
upper level political position than the expected marginal return to political skill
in the market sector for an incumbent politician.
4.3.4 Term Limits
In this model, the introduction of term limits for lower level political positions
reduces the options of politicians for the second period of their lives. Rather than
having three options after serving one term in a lower level political position,
politicians are forced to give up their lower level office and either campaign for
an upper level political position or enter the market sector.
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4.4 Results
4.4.1 Advancement to Upper Level Politican Positions
Let E1(p) denote the expected utility derived by an incumbent in a lower level
political office if the incumbent chooses to leave the political sector and enter the
market sector . Let E2(p) denote the expected utility derived by an incumbent
in a lower level political office if the incumbent chooses to seek re-election for
a second term in the lower level political office. Finally, let E3(p) denote the
expected utility derived by an incumbent in a lower level political office if the
incumbent chooses to vacate the lower level position and campaign for an upper
level position. Now,
E1(p) = w
0 + s(w00 − w0)p (4.9)
E2(p) = θ [g + hp] + (1− θ)E1(p) (4.10)
E3(p) = γ [l + kp] + (1− γ)E1(p) (4.11)
Let p0 denote the level of political skill such that E2(p0) = E3(p0). Let p∗
denote the level of political skill such that E1(p∗) = E3(p∗).
p0 =
g − [γl + (1− γ)w0]




k − s(w00 − w0) (4.13)
I restrict discussion to those equilibria in which all three options are chosen.
This only occurs when g > w0 > l, that is, the minimum payoff a politician can
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receive from serving a second term at the lower level office exceeds the market
sector wage for an incumbent politician with low market skill, which in turn
exceeds the minimum payoff a politician could receive in an upper level office
autonomous of political skill. Also, I restrict the values of the parameters such
that 0 ≤ p∗ ≤ 1.
Proposition 10 Suppose that g > w0 > l and h > γk + (1− γ)s(w00 −w0) and
p∗ < p, then incumbent politicians with political skill p ∈ [0, p∗] will opt out of the
political sector for the market sector. Also incumbent politicians with political
skill p ∈ [p∗, p] will choose to campaign for an upper level political position.
Finally, incumbent politicians with political skill p ∈ [p, 1] will seek re-election
to a second term in their lower level political position.
Proof. For p ∈ [0, p∗), p∗ < p, therefore these individuals would not be retained
by voters. Also
(k − s(w00 − w0))p− (w0 − l) < 0
⇒ l + kp− (w0 + s(w00 − w0)p) < 0
⇒ E1(p) > E3(p).
For p ∈ (p∗, p), these individuals would not be retained by voters. Also
(k − s(w00 − w0))p− (w0 − l) > 0
⇒ l + kp− (w0 + s(w00 − w0)p) > 0
⇒ E3(p) > E1(p).
Finally, for p ∈ (p, 1], E2(p) = g + hp > w0 + s(w00 − w0)p = E1(p)
as g > w0 and h > s(w00 − w0).
Also, since g > w0 > l and h > γk + (1− γ)s(w00 − w0) then
g + hp > γl + (1− γ)w0 + [γk + (1− γ)s(w00 − w0)] p
⇒ E2(p) > E3(p).
Proposition 10 states that if the marginal return to political skill from a
second term is higher than the expected marginal return from campaigning
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for an upper level office, then politicians with the highest political skill will
remain in their lower level office for a second term. Of those who would not be
successfully re-elected to a second term in lower level office, p ∈ [0, p], those with
higher political skill, p ∈ [p∗, p], campaign for an upper level political position.
The rest enter the market sector.
Under these circumstances, the imposition of term limits would not change
the political skill set of politicians who would opt out of the political sector for
the market sector after one term in a lower level position. However, removing the
option for a second term in the lower level position would improve the expected
political skill of politicians seeking upper level political positions.
Proposition 11 Suppose that g > w0 > l and γk + (1− γ)s(w00 −w0) > h and
p∗ < p < p0 ≤ 1, then incumbent politicians with political skill p ∈ [0, p∗] will
opt out of the political sector for the market sector. Also incumbent politicians
with political skill p ∈ [p∗, p] will choose to campaign for an upper level political
position. Meanwhile, those with political skill p ∈ [p, p0] will seek re-election to a
second term in their lower level political position. Finally, incumbent politicians
with political skill p ∈ [p0, 1] will choose to campaign for an upper level political
position.
Proof. For p ∈ [0, p∗), p∗ < p, therefore these individuals would not be retained
by voters. Also
(k − s(w00 − w0))p− (w0 − l) < 0
⇒ l + kp− (w0 + s(w00 − w0)p) < 0
⇒ E3(p) < E1(p).
For p ∈ (p∗, p), these individuals would not be retained by voters. Also
(k − s(w00 − w0))p− (w0 − l) > 0
⇒ l + kp− (w0 + s(w00 − w0)p) > 0
⇒ E3(p) > E1(p).
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For p ∈ (p, p0), g − [γl + (1− γ)w0] > [γk + (1− γ)s(w00 − w0)− h] p
⇒ g + hp > γl + (1− γ)w0 + [γk + (1− γ)s(w00 − w0)] p
⇒ E2(p) > E3(p).
Also, E2(p) = g + hp > w0 + s(w00 − w0)p = E1(p)
Finally, for p ∈ (p0, 1], E2(p) = g + hp > w0 + s(w00 − w0)p = E1(p) and
g − [γl + (1− γ)w0] < [γk + (1− γ)s(w00 − w0)− h] p
⇒ E3(p) > E2(p).
Proposition 11 states that when the marginal return to political skill from a
second term is lower than the expected marginal return from campaigning for an
upper level office, then politicians with the highest political skill will campaign
for an upper level political position. That is, of those who would be successful
in a re-election bid in the lower level office, p ∈ [p, 1], only those of the highest
political skill, p ∈ [p0, 1], campaign for the upper level political positions. Of
those who would not be successfully re-elected to a second term in lower level
office, p ∈ [0, p], those with higher political skill, p ∈ [p∗, p], will also campaign
for an upper level political position. So, candidates for upper level political
positions are drawn from p ∈ [p∗, p] ∪ [p0, 1].
Under these circumstances, the imposition of term limits would not change
the political skill set of politicians who would opt out of the political sector for
the market sector after one term in a lower level position. However, the impact
on the expected political skill of politicians seeking upper level political positions
by the removal of the option for a second term in the lower level position is
ambiguous. If p − p∗ > 1 − p0, then the implementation of term limits lowers
the expected political skill of politicians seeking upper level political positions.
If p − p∗ < 1 − p0, then the implementation of term limits raises the expected
political skill of politicians seeking upper level political positions.
Proposition 12 Suppose that g > w0 > l and γk + (1− γ)s(w00 −w0) > h and
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p < p∗ < p0 ≤ 1, then incumbent politicians with political skill p ∈ [0, p] will opt
out of the political sector for the market sector. Also incumbent politicians with
political skill p ∈ [p, p0] will seek re-election to a second term in their lower level
political position. Finally, incumbent politicians with political skill p ∈ [p0, 1]
will choose to campaign for an upper level political position.
Proof. For p ∈ [0, p), these individuals would not be retained by voters. Also,
since p∗ > p
(k − s(w00 − w0))p− (w0 − l) < 0
⇒ l + kp− (w0 + s(w00 − w0)p) < 0
⇒ E1(p) > E3(p).
For p ∈ (p, p0), E2(p) = g + hp > w0 + s(w00 − w0)p = E1(p) and
g + hp > γl + (1− γ)w0 + [γk + (1− γ)s(w00 − w0)] p
⇒ E2(p) > E3(p).
For p ∈ (p0, 1], (k − s(w00 − w0))p− (w0 − l) > 0
⇒ l + kp− (w0 + s(w00 − w0)p) > 0
⇒ E3(p) > E1(p).
And g − [γl + (1− γ)w0] < [γk + (1− γ)s(w00 − w0)− h] p
⇒ E3(p) > E2(p).
Proposition 12 states that the marginal return to political skill from a second
term is lower than the expected marginal return from campaigning for an upper
level office, then politicians with the highest political skill will campaign for
an upper level political position. All of those who would not be successfully
re-elected to a second term in lower level office, p ∈ [0, p], choose to enter the
market sector. Of those who would be successfully re-elected for a second term
in a lower level position, p ∈ [p, 1], those with the least political skill, p ∈ [p, p0],
choose to seek re-election.
Under these circumstances, the imposition of term limits would improve the
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expected political skill of politicians who would opt out of the political sector for
the market sector after one term in a lower level position. However, removing the
option for a second term in the lower level position would worsen the expected
political skill of politicians seeking upper level political positions.
4.4.2 Candidate Entry
Let EV (π, ε) denote the expected discounted payoff of entering the political
sector for an individual receiving signal (π, ε). Let E4(π) denote the expected
payoff of entering the market sector for an individual receiving political skill
signal π. Finally, let E5(π) denote the expected payoff of entering the political
sector but being unsuccessful in getting elected to a lower level political position
for an individual receiving political skill signal π. Assume that p is distributed







(1− αp) for π = 0











for π = 0











for π = 0
(1 + β) 2 b3 for π = 1
(4.16)
Suppose that only those receiving an electability signal ε = 1 have the option
to enter the political sector. One explanation might come from the role of
political parties in recruiting members. Suppose political parties, representing
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the gatekeepers of the political sector, care only about electability, and observe
ε for each individual. Given the probabilities φ and τ , it might be optimal for
them to only select those with ε = 1 as party members and thus limit those able
to campaign for a lower level political position. Consider the case in which those
receiving signals (0, 1) and (1, 1) choose to enter the political sector, as would be
the case if EV (0, 1) ≥ E4(0) ≥ EV (0, 0) and EV (1, 1) ≥ E4(1) ≥ EV (1, 0). In
such a case, the expected political skill of a challenger for a lower level political
position and the expected political skill of those elected to a first term in a
lower level political position is p = 12 . Now, consider the case in which only
those receiving the signal (1, 1) choose to enter the political sector. In such a
case, the expected political skill of a challenger for a lower level political position
and the expected political skill of those elected to a first term in a lower level
political position is p = 23 . If only individuals with with signal (0, 1) find it






Let σ1(p) ∈ [0, 1] denote the optimal strategy of an incumbent in a lower
level political position to enter the market sector in the absence of term limits.
Similarly, let σ2(p) ∈ [0, 1] denote the optimal strategy of an incumbent in a
lower level political position to campaign for a second term in the absence of term
limits. Finally, let σ3(p) ∈ [0, 1] denote the optimal strategy of an incumbent in
a lower level political position to campaign for an upper level political position
in the absence of term limits. Now, σ1(p) = 1 denotes the decision to enter
the market sector, σ2(p) = 1 denotes the decision to campaign for a second
term, σ3(p) = 1 denotes the decision to campaign for an upper level office, and
σ1(p) + σ2(p) + σ3(p) = 1. Therefore, in the absence of term limits,
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[E1(p)σ1(p) +E2(p)σ2(p) +E3(p)σ3(p)] f(p|π)dp
+φ (1− δ)E5(π)
Let EV L(π, 1) denote the expected discounted payoff of entering the political
sector for an individual receiving signal (π, ε) in the presence of term limits.
Let bσ1(p) ∈ [0, 1] denote the optimal strategy of an incumbent in a lower level
political position to enter the market sector in the presence of term limits, where
bσ1(p) = 1 denotes the decision to enter the market sector, bσ1(p) = 0 denotes
the decision to campaign for an upper level office. Therefore, in the presence of
term limits,








[E1(p)bσ1(p) +E3(p) (1− bσ1(p))] f(p|π)dp
+φ (1− δ)E5(π)
Note that EV L(π, 1) ≤ EV (π, 1) for π ∈ {0, 1}, that is, term limits reduce
the expected discounted payoff of entering the political sector for an individual
receiving signal (π, 1). Also, given that F (p|1) first-order stochastically domi-
nates F (p|0), EV (0, 1) ≤ EV (1, 1) and EV L(0, 1) ≤ EV L(1, 1).
Suppose that in the absence of term limits, it is optimal for individuals














If 12 < p
∗ < p0 < 1and h < γk + (1− γ)s(w00 − w0) then
σ1(p) =












In the presence of term limits, the optimal strategy is
bσ1(p) =




Assume that under term limits, payoffs are such that is it optimal for either
individuals with signals (0, 1) or individuals with signals (1, 1), or both to enter
the political sector.
Proposition 13 Term limits can only lead to an improvement in the expected
political skill of lower-level office holders if EV L(0, 1) ≤ E4(0) ≤ EV (0, 1) and
E4(1) ≤ EV L(1, 1) ≤ EV (1, 1). Otherwise term limits lead to a reduction in
the expected political skill of lower-level office holders.
The only way that term limits can result in an improvement in the expected
political skill of lower-level office holders is if it improves the expected political
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skill of entrants to the political sector, since term limits removes the ability of
voters to retain incumbents with high political skill for a second term. This can
only occur when it is optimal for only individuals with signal (1, 1) to enter,
raising p to 23 .
Now suppose that E4(0) ≤ EV L(0, 1) ≤ EV (0, 1) and E4(1) ≤ EV L(1, 1) ≤
EV (1, 1), so that individuals with signals (0, 1) and (1, 1) find it optimal to
enter.
Proposition 14 Suppose that p∗ < 12 and h > γk + (1 − γ)s(w00 − w0), then
the implementation of term limits improves the expected political skill of those
seeking upper level political positions at the expense of reduced expected political
skill at the lower level political positions.
In the absence of term limits, individuals of the highest political skill would
seek re-election and raise the expected political skill at the lower level when
we average over first and second term office holders. With term limits, those
individuals that would have sought re-election are forced to campaign for upper
level positions.
Proposition 15 Suppose that 12 < p
∗ < p0 ≤ 1 and h < γk+(1−γ)s(w00−w0),
then the implementation of term limits reduces both the expected political skill
of those seeking upper level political positions and the expected political skill at
the lower level political positions.
Proposition 15 describes conditions under which the implementation of term




The implementation of term limits on lower level elected offices reduces the
expected political skill of officeholders at this level. Under limited circumstances,
term limits will also reduce the expected political skill of those seeking upper
level political positions. For the most part, term limitation at lower level offices
lead to an improvement in the quality of elected officials in upper level offices.
The impact of term limits depends on the differences between the marginal
returns to political skill between upper and lower level political positions. If the
marginal returns from a second term in a lower level position (e.g. rewards to
seniority and higher probability of legislative success) are high enough relative
to those at the upper level political positions or in the market sector, term limits
will lead to an improvement in expected political skill at the upper level.
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